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The following Chapters are a condensation and revioion of the series of
twelve articles in review of McClollan's R~port, by WILUAM SwiNTo~,
published in the New York Times, during the months of.February, March,
and April, 1864. In the preparation of. this criticism the author has to
acknowledge the use of large mass of unpublished official documents.
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!fCCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER
REVIEWED AN_D EXPOS~·D.

,

•

I.
"

McCLELLAN AS A POLITICAL STRATEGIST.

It is a fact singularly characteristic of General McClellan that having won what-

ever reputation he eojoye in the field of' 110<Jr, he is now ranning on this reputation
&a the,Presidentiol candidate of a parl.y whose creed is peace and whoae platform

casts contumely on the very war of which their nominee bad for upwards of a year
the chief eonduet. Whe11 we oon~der, b'Owever, that all hie fame is founded on.
defeat.!, it is not wonderfol that hie hopes ehoald etill be bound op in dllfeat'..I, Gen•
eral :McClellan'• President.al proepec\s brighten Just in proportion as oar soldiert
suffer disaster, and he will only be certain of berng President of our country whea
it ie certai11 we have no country at all
There is ao object more caloulated to olaim the sympathy of a generous eeople
than a defeated general; and unlell8 h1e failure has been associated with c1rcum1tances of peraonal i.urpitude he ie pretty sure, aooner or later, to receive that aym'.
palhy. Macbiavell~ that subtle observer, points out that the Romans never blamed
their unsuccessful commanders, uteeming that to a high-minded man the mortification of defeat ,vas of itself punishment. enough. Sertorius, Mithridates and William of Orange were habituafly unsuccessful generals, and yet history has not chosen
to cast contamely on their nsn1 e: on the oontrary,:the memory of their failures ia
covered up by the remembrance of quslities of mind that deserved, if they could not
command, succee&
It bae been left for General McClellan, however, to claim not merely the sympathy of bis countrymen (which would have been accorded him had bis conduct been
marked by the modesty of a soldier) bl\t their aomiration and highest rewards for a
eeries of exploits in which tbto couutt·y suffered only disaster.
General McClellan's candidacy for the Prellidency dou not begin'"With the nomination at Chicago. While bis soldiers were being struck down by .thousands with
the fevers of tlje Chickabomioy, f.Qe fever of the White House strack him. There
are a thousand things both in his 111ilitary career and in bis sabuqne11t condad
that can only be explained on this theory. No doubt he would have been glad to
have founded his Presidential pretensions on succe88 ; bat as this was not possible
be enrly conceived a cha.ractet1stic change of 1,ase: be determined to found them on
defeat. He could not make failures triumph!', but he woald adventure a Bauldng
movement in the field of poliLics more bold than any he e•er euayed on the field
of w11r: he woald throw the burden of all hia failur.!"' upon an Administrat.ion ...,Jtich
tbw11r. ed all hie b1·illiaot 11l1101 aucl ensured d.,feat where be had organized vietory I 'l'h1s deeper•te enL~rpriee be h&d a tteu:J~ted to carry thougb lo a document
publiehed a few months ago, whi.cb, under the ~uise of a ";Report," is really
elaborate political manifesto. ,
'
Rad Oeneral McCleUan not bee& a proe~ctive candidate (or the Presidency, it
woulJ be difficult t.o bring bis so cslled "Report" in~ any known category. If it
ie leas than a Report it is 11lso more than a Report. It is le~ than a Report bec11UM
numerous dispatebe.e of the time are omitted from this collection. It is also more
tb&n a strictly military Report, because its , ~asi,1 is a )l ell\borate l;tiej;!>rioa,I, and
argumentative recita1:•10 which such aispatchee l\a are u,ed bv <lenera, 1JeJl.e,J.a II'
are inlaid. Military Repor&a in the aeuae in which any soldier underatands the
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,_-4;; are written either from

the battle-field itself, or, in the imposaibility of that,

as speedily after the action as it is posaible for the staff to collect the requ1aite data.
There have been General! w~o have seen. fit at the close pf thelr career to puhlis\l
1
their displit'e"'b~ ih'colllcted fomi! Such ,. legacy' was lett
to militJry llist.ory by
ihe.._g rtM lron I)uk'e. But/whit i, ~~li•r iq W ~Uington's 'publication of his dis-

patches is thal he bas left these memorials of his career in their strict chronological order, in their exac! original state: he has not suppressed -a line, nor added a
word of commentary, nor a word of argument, nor a word of a~"°'~tiop nor a wo1·d
oljustificatroi.';J ;,-,
I j
I• J ' l \ '
t • .. I )
.Not so l'.;~1hi'ral'1.reCle1lan1e Report. The labor of a whole twelvemonth, cornpoeed in the lei.lure of retiracy, and after the publication of most of the material
likely to bear on hie fame, its purpose seema Iese to record a series of military transaotions than-to vindicate his conduct and arraign the Administration. No charge
ls too great, none too email, to draw out from biUl a replication : and he is e4,ually ready, whether to bring railing accusations against bis military superiors, to
bowl down the Committee on the Conduct of the War, or to blow up the news-

n

papers.

In this state of facts, a critical analysis of this so-called "Report" becomes a mat-

•
I

ter which concerns the welfare of the country not le88 than the truth of history.

n

ill to this task I propose addressiog ,myself It will be our duty to pierce to the historieal truth underlying the veneer which General McClellan has spread over even ta,
to endeavor to seiz,11 by the ~ding-clu, of qnpubli,shed. dispatches how much here
set down as original motive 1s really afterthought, and to examine the foundation of
the,cbe.,rges w.hich be heaps npon the Adrowht-ration. lf l do not succeea in prov-•
ing py docdi;neutary evidence tb11t every Qne of Gene1·al McClellan's failures was
the result of his own conduct and cbaracter,-if I do ,not prove his career as a
~ho1e to have J?een a fa\lure unmatcb,ed, in ~,ilitary history, and if I do not fasten
upon h!bn conduct, which; in any other country in the world would have eaused
~1m to l:ie ,c ourt-martialed and dismissed the servjce,-1 shall ask the reader to acrpt bll plea.in abatement of judgment and accord _him the patent o'f distlinguished
g 91ieralsh,p. l3ui if I make good all I have aai~, I shall ask the reader to cbaracterue in fittiilg term• the conduct of a man who, receiving the heartieet support of
the Gov~rpment, the laril!h confide,nce of the people, and the unstinted resources' of
t he nati1>n, achieves nothing but defeat, aua terminates a career of uuexam pied failu,:e by charging the blame upon a1.1 AdminilMation whose only fault was not to haV&
ioonet to di~overed hia incapacity. '
,
. ·

II.
I

!I'HE "YOUNG NAPOLEON."

] t: was the good fortune of General McClellan to come into command while the
p.ublic mind was in a peculiar mood. The disastrous upshot of a forwar d moveutent in which the nation was conscious of having used too great urgency had given
fi~ to complete abnegation of all criticism on the part of the people and the press.
Bd)l Run had educated us, and, in a fit of patriotic ~emorse, men reoounced_eve~ything that might appear like pressure on the Government or the oommande1·~ of our
Kmies.
.
The natio'~ did mpre: it literally threw open~ arms to receive the young chief
~ho'sen to lead its foremost army. He1 came ia 'IVith no cold suspicion, but with a
wa~w and generous· welco~e. It yillal ways remain one of ~he most _e:Xt,aordinary
pbeoome1~a of our extraordinary times that a young man without military exper1ooce, leaping from a captaln'iY to thE. highest grade in our militacy 1,tierarchy, and
b~lnging with him only the prestige of a series of email opel'~tion! which auo_tlJer
than be planued and executed,* ,e!),011ld have been at one, received mto the nation's
eoafidence and credited in, adv'a nce with e'\'ery mil~U!,ry quality a11d capacity. It
may pot be -very ~a~teriug to 011r COlll/AOll sense to looJ. back,,at the time when this
h e,ro of tinfougnt field• was t!ll!;eo Of¼ trust as ,a "young '.Napoleon ;" but it re111aina,
aeverth'elese1 a piece of history; an<l. ,when a few weeks after asauming command,
he' t'old his soldiers, ""We have had our last retreat, we jiav,e seen qur last defeah
you stand by m~ and I'll stand py ydu,'' a too-confiding people applav.ded the bomb88\ as having the true N apo~eonic .. rini I
,
B'eyond a doubt these things showed the ~ilitar7 j\lvenility of America; but the.y
yere J?ODe the lesa ~be manifestation~ of a mood o i:n.ind which an able Con;imander
• I nlean of oouree General

R'osecrao'a! The Reporl or lbal generaJ Including W. operations in

1helern Yirpnia, wlU, IL Is b'oj>ed, IOOD be pultlltlle,I.
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eould ho.ve turned to immense account. General McClellan had but to ask, and it
wtu ~i ven him-indeed it came without askiog. Every energy of the Government.,
an'ir nil the resources of-a generous and patr\otic people, were ll\vishly placed at hia
dis~oe11l, to enable him to gather together an army nnd put it in the most complete
atate of efficiency/ so that offensive movements might be resumed at tb,e earliest
possible moment. The time of that movement was however, W\th a sctupuloua
1
General McClellan comaelacacy left in the hands of the Commander himself.'
plains of the "vehemence with which an immediate advance upon the enemy's
works directly in our front was urged by 'a patriotic people." I am very sure
that not only was no "immediate advance" urged, but that no advance at all waa
n:pected' duriog·any portion ·of the period in which General McClellan .eays he wae
•ngaged in organiging the army. "It was neoeaeary," says be,• "to create a new
army for act1ve operations and to expedite its organizatioa,_ eqnipment.,,and the aoeumulatl~n of the material of war, and to this not inconsiderable labq~ all my ,ener-1
gies for the next three month3 were e.,certed." AB General 11!:cCl«l\11111 aseumed,cominand of the army in the lattt>r part of July (21th), the "three months" spokeq of
would bring us to tbe 1st o( November. Now it would m>t be difficult to &bow that
during no part of that period did the public ebow anything like " vehemence " for
an advance. The country understood that a new a1·my had to be organized; indeed there wae if anything, a disposition to exaggerate both the time required for
this work and its inherent difficulties; and aa a large share -of, tbe,fame of Gener,al
McClellan rests on the theory of bis having "organized" the army, it may be worth
while making a brief divemon to penetrate into the interior of this awful mystery
of organization.
.
One would suppose from tne tone of General McClellan that when he ca~e to th6
Army of the Poto,mac there was no army to command. " I found," says be (pa~
4,4), "no army to command-a mere e-0Uection of regiment3, cowering on the baolu
the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat." Now,
the facts of the case are that he came into command of fifty thousand men, and th~y
were very far from being" a mere colleotion of ref/imenu." The brigade and divtlional organization ~isted and had ezjsted, bavmg been established l>y General
McDowell. The organization of modern armies is a matter long ago fixed, and iii.
not an a,ffair which admits either of invention or of innovation: The hierarchy by
~be, battalion, brigade, di vision, and corps, first formulated in the Ordonnanc, lit.
.Roi;i:a the military system of every European nation; and our own military code ia,
ill fact, a translation of it. It is not clear, therefore, bow th ere was room for tloe
exel'cise of any su'e h mysterious p<'wers of organization ae have been attributed to
Genernl McClellan, and he certainly put forth none. He found tbe framework of
brigad~ ,and divisions, and. .he..c:on.lJn,ued it, simply piling up !M1'4 brigades and
more divisions..t There- only -remained to push -the ol'ganization one etep higher,
and th!i.t step be did not take.· ··Oar Tegular· army having ,always been yery e ~
no •higher unit of orgariizatio1i:thap, tli\l_divi#~ .had· existed or bad been required.
What became absolutely necessary as soon as the neeas of the war created great
llrmiee of one' or two ·hundred, tbous,nd men was to establish the higber fig1iting
unii--the corps d'armee-without whicb. .no large' army can effe9tively ,enter Ul!QD
an active campaign. (1-eneral McOlellan would never conse-nt to the establis/1:ment-oj
worps. 'l;he only novelty oC.or,l6anization, therefore, which, it was p6ssible for him
to rnstitute, he wou,ld not and did not. Re left the army an acepbalous agglomer•
ation qf thiJ"teen divisions, without correlation, unity or cohesion; and it bec&Dle
necessary for the President, mont\ts afterwards, and i11. opposition to General :i.r.CfelJ,l!.n, to constitute corps just t)ie army w~ Q~, the point of setting out on an t.ive cam_paign.
,
·
_
The period ' of tbreo montbs, during which General,., li'cplellan, ac~ordin~ to hie
own statement, was ~ngaged in reorganizing t~e. ""DJ'Y, l,i~r i11g ,P.B.'/8ed,-tqe G~vernment and the nation became· naturally anxious that the spleir~1d army o'r o~r
a hundred and fifty thousand men, which bad by thi,, time grown U)l on the ban.p'
of the Potomac, should be turned to account. . Our foreign relatioiie, ½\tr doroestio
interests, our national honor-every consideration qo.nspir~d to ..rge an a£taek en the
insolent foe who held the Capital in siege. But durio~ no period' o/ tlae six monthe
aucceeding the lat of November-and during all ofwh1ob period tbe. motive<1,f(}~
• Reporl, p. G.
'
·
1
• ,
, Wbai.ever credll 11 claimed for lho pradlcal or1an~atlo11 of '11•• arm,7 belong,, to Brlg•clt- •,
General (n,ow Major-General) Sllu Caeey, a painstaking l&ollolan, ,rho labored wllh lirelees llldul•y a11be lasl< of brlgadh1g lhe 1tew!y a rrived regimenla The u11UJ1pUon of Ill• c,ed!I or lb&i
won by Gei,oral M1CIN1111 i. a 11amn1 irletance or Meo,...,,. MM :
'TU !pllgbl
lhe i.oar,
The 1<11>& ba4 U.1 &leift.~
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advance became progressively more and mol:e 1mpefativ-did or would General
McCl~llau cou$ent, lo 1nove his army. If there are 11,n y considerations that go to
justify this deJ~y, it is only fair to Genera\ ~~Clellan that he shll hlL•·e the benefit
of their full weight, 8.1,ld this S\lbje(\t is worth, examining witlnome fulnes•, because
there is a close logical connexion betw:j\en ~hat Jong inaction and all the sub~eq\lent
111 fortune pf the Arm,y of the Potomall-f • ,
'
,
1
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:A IlUNDR.Eb AND F!li'17 THOt•S-AND MBN "l~ BUOKBAM."
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'Th'e fe io one cbar,wterisUc of General 't,fodl<;!lllln w hieb ~isplays it.telf eo ptt'!list1!ntly, 1?otli in bis·R;enort>and in bis eonduet; that..i,nr,usb belong to tl1e very structure of hi!t 1intellect. W'ha& I "mean is a certain inequality of vision which pnte
facts out of all jnst relation's, gHes him oM etandard of judgment forr himeelf and
another for others, and 'leads him to a J)l'odigions over-estimate of immediate, and a
prodigious under-estimate of remote difficulbiee. "The fi,·st q,ualification in I\ (:eneral,"
says Napoleon, "is 1cool head-that is, a head which re<!e1ves just impressions, and
estimates \binks and"objects at their real value. Some men are so constituted as te
see eve1·ythiug through a high-colored medium. Whatev~r knowledge, or talent
or courage, 01· other good qualitiea such men may possess, nature has not formed
' them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations."
· This key will aid us in the interpretation of that extraordinary tendency to exaggerate the force of the enemy which we find him displaying at the ve,·y oub1et of
Ii.is career, and wHich continued to grow upon him throughout its whole course.
The (frat in&tance in which we have a distinot utterance frl»O General McClellan
on the p oint of the relative strength of bis own and the enemy's force is io a lellter
addrt~sed by him to the Secretary of W a1· in the latter part ol Octobe,·, 1861. • Ir,.
this communication ~e uses the following language:
.
"So much lltne hao passed, and \be wlptt\r I• Approaching ro rapidly, that bnt two oour..ie are
len-10 toe Governiuent., viz.: to go Into winter quanero, or to a ..ume '"" ofl'.enaive wiU.fero,

•

qrv.atu i11/orwr fa ,.,.nw,r, eo t4o arm11 I roqar<,l«l a~ ~,•,u;Z, aml n,css,ary.
Now, the fu,st question is, what ilwnbei; he regard~d ns n1>t only "desirable" but
"nece8Bary,'' in order to enable l;iirn to 8/!Sume the offen!!i ve. Happily, on this point
we have from himself precise information, for in a subsequent par.I, of the same.com•
munioation he gives what he calls au" estimate.of the requisite force for au advan~
movement by the Army of tile Potoo:uic.''i It i• as aa followsr: ·
"Column ot 'artlve opetellons.......... ,1 , • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••100,000 men, 400 gun,.
Garriron ·or the eily of Waobington ........................... .,,., .......•
To guard ;he Potomac IQ llarpcr'J· Ferry .•••.. '.., . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . • . . . • . • • .
To guard ihe Lbwer l'0\')~1ac . ...............•.,, ............: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garrison for 'DalUmore and AnoaJ)oUe . .. , ... .-1.J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86,000
6,000
8,000 '
10,000

"
"
"
"

40 ,•
12 •
24 "
12 "

' , ..............•.....••••....208,000 men, 488 guna,
To~! ofTeclive force .require,!,............ .....
or an aggregaCe, pres.,m and absent, ot 4bout 240,000 men, ~01lld tbe loose• by sickness, &c., not
rise 1,0'a higher per ceoiage th'Jul at preieo\." ,

•

As the strength or an arn1y, like any other means for the accomplishment of a
ce1·tairl e~d, is l)ecesll'arlly cont1·01l~d by the object to b\ aceornpli,hed and .the resistance to be o-vercom", we must seektbe tationale of the extraorqinary estimate put
forth by General McClellan of the military fdrc'e required as an indispensable condition precedent to auy offensive operations, in his calculation of the strengl.b of pbe
army which the rebels were abl~ to eon!ront·him withal. Fortunately on this p<hot,
also, w~_are uot left in the dark, for he. goes on to state that all his info1·mntion
showed tb(t in November, 1861, "the enemy had a force on tl,e Pot<rmac, 11ot le«a
tl,an 150,000 a;rong, wll drilled a,td equjpped, ably c<rmmanded, and atrongly en-

trenched."

·

11 i1, lid trlle that at a.ny period during the fall or winter of 1861--2, the re~~h had
"oi. tlu Pufomac" an aru1y of the strength claimed by General .McClel111D-a11 army
of one hundred and fifty thousand men-then we must coifcede tbat his eetitnate o(
the army he him$elf needed-name~y. au effecting fighting column of tbt same
strength-was n.ot e:tces~i"e, and that his reiterl.ted demands for more men, even
at this early period, were the result of a wise appreciation of the necessities of the
case. But if ,it can be altown that this rebel colossus of a hundred, and fifty thousand men was a mon~trons delusion, ~he figment of a "heat•op_preal!ed brain," we'
shall require to find ot~r terms in which· to cb.aracterize his conduct a':1,d hie
clamor.
• Repon,p._a.

•

7
Now, l thlok I can show t.1at the rebel army 011 the Potomac, BO far frooi
being of the foroe of 150,000 meo, wae never more than 07ll-third that number. Tbt
battle of Bull Run waa fought on the part of the rebels with a force of Iese thao
Lhirty thnueand meo. Gener·al Beauregard, in his official report, says : "'l'he elfec,tive force of all arms of the (Confederate) Anny of the Potomac on thllt eve,it!ul
mbrniog, including the garrison of Camp Pickens, did not eirceed 21,833 men, and
29 guns. 'fbe Army of the l:lhenandoah, (Jubnston'd,) ready f r iu:tion in the field
may be eet down J\t 6,000 men aod 20 guns, and ite total etreogtb nt 8,884."
We nre tbenl to believe that the rebel army in the interval of three months, Mo·
iween the end of July and the end of October, leaped from thirty thousand men to
a hundred and fHty thousand I Oredat J1td<X:UB ! lt is too rhonetroue to beli~ve. 11
would take double the time even to brigade euoh a herd of meo. It would indeed
be difficult to say what the precise strength of the rebel force was dariog the perioa
refel'l'ed to, especially M it vai·ied greatly, baviog attai'ued a certain maxrmnm.
then declined by the expiration of the ~rm of service, and then commenced to a.
oend once moro when the first conscription came into force. I do not, therefoM
'attempt to do this. I merely desire to ehow that the swelling figures thal
affrigbted the soul of the tbeo head of the Army of the Potomac existed only in bit
imagination, and to fix a maximtim beyond which it ia certain the rebel army did

.

Mtgo.

During t.he autumn of 1861, while the rebel army wae stiU at Centerville, a letter
written from that place fell into the hands of the military authorities. The writer.
referring to the flutter that existed in the ranks of their army in regard to the creation of a certs.in number of Major Oeneral.t, tells how the Confederate Army wu
o,gani~ed intq brigades of four divisions each, like our&, but that they only put two
brigndes,into a divisiob-tbat is.J_hey put eight regim ent.) or battalions instead o!
twelve, u we have. '' Now," !IIJS the writer, "this makes qui~ a stir as to tb.
ai,poiotment of the twehe .Major Generals." This wo ,Id give them • twenty-four
brigades, or ninety-aix regimeal& The average strength of their regiments at that
ti111e Ce!'tainly did not exceed that of our own at the same period, 600 men; and
this woulli give them a total of 67,600 men.•
Now. it ie worthy of note tbal General YcOlellan him,el(, siic monthe an.er tbt
,late of bis estimate of the rebdl force "oo the Potomac," d 160,000 mec, give,
another eet.imate wade by bis chief of the aceret eervics corp• on the 8th of March.
in wi\ich the rebel troops at Manlll!Sas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, and
vieioity are put down at 80,000. Note thnt this was after the rebel conscriptioll
had gone into force and qad s-:elled the Confederate ranks witb il~ har vesting; and
th.at, no~withstandiog all this, it gives a 1e11ult leu by ievenl!J tlumtand than the 6@·
'Ure made out by General McOlelfao in the month of November. At one stroke the
r ebel h~odred. 11nd fift,Y thoueaud in \iuckram had dwindled by a half!
r Fro'm all theae data, t believ,e 1 am authorize(! in concluding that Johnston a,
I\O lime had on the Potomac an army of OVeT 60,0QO meo. And it was before this con•
temptible foi:ee that our matnifieent 11rmy of th1-ee times its strength-no, oot the
or,,1y, but it.a cM!tm,.,td<,r-atood paralyzed for elgbt montbal Such II spectacle th,.
history of the w-o1·ld never before present<id.
Whether ·General McClellan e'V'e!' really 6elie,,ed that be 11al in front of him u
army of a hundred &nd fifty thousand men, or anything like tt111t figure, is a poin1
"111'-hich 't do nolr ~retend to detennine. t But certain it is t1iat having tixed upoa
this number, •11 bi.a eu~eqtieut efforts, eeero to bpl'e been directed, not t.o the \w
Df deet.roying the en.emy before hia\, b.ut of forcing t.ae Government t.o give him a
cOf'll.maud wbieh he could never hnn brought into act.ion in any batUe-lield '{iP•
,There are Ul-, Indeed, wbo pul lbe r~bel ltree.on lbe Potomao al III ewn lower ftJtUre. Mr
Hurlbert., wbo al Ibis t)me wa, wltlrln the rebel llne11 ao(j ~a,cl aoOOM 10 ~d aouroea of tnronu,
tlonl PY• In tbe nolcs to bis translallon or Ibo pampblel of tho P rine~ da Jl'olnv!Ue 011 Ille Arm.y 0 ,

Uie >ot.on1ac.
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" I ban reuon lo 'bellen thal "hen life llhilory of Iba p,-01 war ,bli.11 come lo be Wl'ltiea
t•'11¥ aJld lo full, 1, will bofQuod tbatGe11eral J,1110•1011i1everlnle11ded lo hold Ma11usa1 ,ndGet>·
lrevlUo acalnst any serious alt.ack; tbal bli army at t.ll<>lll p<>lnljl had toll'ered a-rea&!_r da•lna; lht
aulnmn ud 'Winter or 1$61-,, a,,d {bat from Oc1obcr lo March Ao ,....,. ~d a1'.ff~• Jo,rH 1¥
.,..,,.. Chan 4e teO m••nmder bi. orllero.''
~'
•
• '
t II Is po!llti1e be did, ,for 11 11 aalo~lng Iba &rlcu wblcb lbe tear, J>nd 'tbe llni t.,. ot a, )bus ol\llapplly orcMal.?Mi, wUI .plar him; and l a"I 11'llllng lo bellev" )11&1 Gn~ul Mc01411ui
•as quite a. '11)uch deoot,,ed as aecelYlng. h la pnsslblo General >,fcClellAn . reallT b•li••oalh•
1'8bel• bad 111Q.OOO men on the Potomac, -when they never bad a third of that n,umbe•, Jn•I a, io
J• pouiblill he b<lllen·d Ibey had OD& hundred Lbo111&n<l, lben lwo budred tbeHaotl lbea 1"11'•
).tondred and flfty thousand IIIJlll OD lbe l'e.nlnauta, when Ure lrolh wu Ibey neur had :.ver 70,QOI
men-Qr •• he believed Ibey Invaded Maryland wllh a hundred and elgbty lltoueaod moo, wbetl
tbelr lolal rorce was flfty-he thou.and. All tl\,ia, ,l ...
~\b\e; J>v.l
ror Ute J,apleea Ill·
Uoa wboae Calo wa, WDlllli\tell lo the ltee,Pl~J 'or ,m, leade; J
,, ._

,.1a

ginia furnishes. From thi!t time forth begins a series of whinings anu wbimperings
for troops, the mos, extraordinary ever put ou 1·ee-ord. '' l have not the force I
G!ffted for;" •• send me more troops," beeame the perpetual cry. These, with the'
occasional e:-tpressiou of his determioati.ou to "do the beat he can" with what pitiful
force he had, and to " share its fate,", form the staple of every communication.
~ow, when General McClellan wd forming this heroic resolve, will any one imagine bow much of a force he had I, He bad asked for 240,000 men, from which to
take a fighting column of Jo0,000, It is true, he was never able to get this number,
but it is perhaps worth while det~nnining what he did get.
Jt appears fro[ll the ot!icinl reports that on the morning of the 27th Oclober, the
aggregate strength of the Army of the Potomac was 168,318 men-p1·esent for duty,
169,4,52. On Januar}". 11 J'862, it was 219,'707~present for duty, 191,480. On February 1, it WM 222,196-present for duty, 19~,142. Such was the pitiful bagatelle
,:,fa force he had under his command I He had asked for 240,000; he could Devel'
get over 222,196; and oDe can sympatb~e with bis eense of ill treatment in con'
•
sequence.
We think, however, thnt we have read of brilliant campaigns and splendid victories achieved with something ,Jess than two hundred and forty thou88Ild men·. If ·
we recollect aright Napoleon made bis first great Italian campaign with under forty
thousand men; fought Austerlitz with fot•ty-five thousand and Marengo with thirtyfive thousand; and we think we have heard tbai Wellington, in the whole Pehineular war, never had ov,er thirty .thousand; that Turenne more ,frequent~ com~anded ten thousand th11n fifty thousand; that Marlborough won .Blenheim witlh
ti.fty six thousand, and R_amillies with sixty tb~usaad tro_ops; aod that Frederick
llle Gr,ea~ con<>ucted the i:ieven Year&' War, agatns\ a c.aht10u of more than half of
Europe, with au army never exceeding a hundred thousand men. But they we,11
old fogies~ those days, and it was left. for the "qo11ng Napoleon," who had never
handled I.en ,thousand troops in llis life, to require ®Uble-1, hundred thousand to fill
up the measu1·e o( 'his, swelling ambition..
·
, •.
.
In faet, the t1·ou1>le was not that General McCtellan bad too small a force; he had
too larg• a foree. He had fashioned a Frankenstein which all hie power could rlot
control-a sword was •put into hie haild which not only he was unable tG wield, but
which dragged b.im to the ground.
·
'

i,

IV.

J

•

THE .MODERN FABIUS A.ND HIS" FALSE 'PRETENCE3,
'

I

Wete it true that: the army put into the hands of General McClellal'.l, ills~ad 9f
being twice or thrice the strength of the rebel force on the Potomac, as I, haye
aho;w.n, was ii;i reality doubly outnumbered by au enemy ,"not less .thl/Jl l5~000
ewmg, well drilled aod equ,ipped. ably commanded, and ~tropgly entrenched;" tlHi
.fact might weii gLve us cause before passing censure on an inactivity. w~ich, howevef deplorable, ,would Btill have had muc)l,to warraDt it. But you baye seen lt!>W
this pretence has been swept nway by a scrutiny .of fact,; and !,now proceed,, to
~hq'f•th11-t
only remaining ex:cuses be offers are equally witJi.out foundation.
T-\1,ese are summed up in the follpwiog paragraph:•
,
"The records of ti,e War Department ahow my anxiety and elforta to uaume aollve olfenalTe ope-

*'

ratlnns In the fall and early winier. II fa only Ju,1 lo aay, however, U1lil th<J unpraudented Cjm·
«ition of~
and Viruinia ,oii.ltould have delayed an advance l\ll Februa:r,:, bad Ille .dlsc4>tlne, orgnniulion, and equipment of the army been a, complete at lbe close of the fall.as was
neee'8ai:y, and ... 111...i«U aud !&bored O!(Jaifl.lt ~~ry imp/5ftimMlt lo make lhem'."

road•

The first elemeu·\ enumerated ia ~he roads and the weather, the condition of which
General .McClellan tells ll8 was'\ unprecedented." If there he auyinfereuoe to be
drawn .from tbid expression and, i\e context, it is that they were "unprecedentedly"
bad, for this reusou i.e given in excuse for not moving. Now it is true that the c9nditio1J vf l'o~d~ of Virgiuia durioii the fall and winter, of 1861··2 was "unprecedented," but unpreeedently goo&-and this, happily, is not a matter in regard to whi~h
we are ·left to the uu'eure teatimoriy of memor,v. We have C(!temporary eviderl\16
whicli establishes the fact by au accumulatton perfe.cily il'l'efragable.. General
Franklin,+ testifying under oath· to• this speoifio porn~, on .tb'e 26th' <i( Deeemb~r,
1861, says: "The c,o)'!ditiou o( the roads is good." General Wadsw,-orth,i on t,be
111me day says : 1 ''The roads are remarkably g99d.,-perhap1 Mt ooce m hnenty years
.\ave (he ;rofW;$ at Ohrietma, been in a, good conditioo a, they are fWID, 'Haying had
•

,f

'

•Va..
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'
thu «mg ptriod of drg ~ <llMr, the roads are very good." So General Fitt Joha
Porter,• in repJy to a query a, to the condition of the roads, uye: " A~ far aa I

k now they are jn exoelfent condition, exeelleot travelling eondiliion." In like manller testified a 8-0ore of otlioersi· I lljed not oite their evid ence, bat will limit my•
1eH to the t6atimooy of a rebe witness. Pollard,f in a passage, the sting of which
is ,barpened by its justice, Mys: "A long, lwgering, Iodian summer, with roads more
bard, and ski~ more beat1lifnl, tbBn Virgit.ia had aeen for many a year, invited the
enemy to advance. He steadily refused the invitation to a geqeral action. The aevance of our lines wa& toleratea to Munson'a Rill, within a few miles of Alexaodrie,
and opportunities were aought in vain by the Confederates, in heavy ekirmishiog,
to engage the lines of lhe two armies."
Precisely the same tendency characterizes General McClellan'• estimate of the
oomparative conditim as of the comparative ,trengt!. or his owo and the enemy'•
army. Ria commuoioationa of the period referred to make frequeut ment.ion of the
superior di,cipline, drill and equipment of the rebels, and the. inferiorit1 in tbre&pects of his own force. Now it is difficult to conjecture on what bae1a General
HeClellan constantly makes this aesertion of the 1uperior fighting powers of the
rebels, uni-with a credulity insulting to the manhood of the loyal Statee-the
rebel rhodomootade on this h ead bad been s wallowed entire by him. Abstractly
eonaidered, they oughi to have beeo.not better soldiera bot worse ; for though their
baiiits _of life and aooial training bad been of a kind to make them tJltirnlJl,ly very
ea:eellent soldiers, they were oalcnlated to make them very inferior sqldiol'e at th8
ovteet..i And this view of it ia fortified by historical testimony ; the evidence of
a!l obaervera goes to abow that previously to the organization of the permanen&
Confederate Army in April and llay, 1862, and while the provisional army was atill
fn existe.oce nod oflicere were elected by the men, nothing could exceed the )axity
ol discipline, the demoralization of temper, and the inferiority in arms, equipment,
and transportetion, that marked the reb<\l force in Virginia. If tbat force afterward
became an army whose formidable valor and superb diecipline we bjlve too oft.en
found out to 011r l)Ollt, it i,s tq be att1-ibuted in great part to the time General MoOlellan gave th~ for 0011solidatioo, and the prestige they gained ))y their -vioto•
riae onr him.
l3at all compariaon is superfluous; what I l!&Y is that General McQlellao'1 cl1WD
that there wa., anythin~ in th_e diacipline of bis army to prntint bi& dealing a blow
at the enemy before h im, is. a shallow makeshift that wiU DO lqnger serve. If it
had been d esigned to make a Pl'Dseiaa or an English army-a thing of pipeolay and
pedantry, of the rat~n and red tape-there might be some force in the call for
months or for years, in which to perfect this painful and uselesa education. But for
modern &rmie& there ia but one•way; it is, after the rudiment.ii of taotics are t.e·
qnired, to put the men promptly into the fiold &ud let them b~ made soldiers by th~
hard realitie& of war. It waa in tbie way, a11d ll.Ot by the pedauu·y of the martine1
that t.b e armi~ of tbe Thirty Y..ars' War, of the American ~volution, a nd of tbe
~eat French Revolntion, were formed. In 1813 rough German levie& fought almost.
befor11 they were drill ed, and at BautT.en French recruit.a were vietoriol.18 over the
fl)abprately trai.o<1d machines that formed the armies of Austril\, Prussia and Ru88iL
Di@~trous n& Bull Run was in it.s military results, it, bey ond a doubt,, did more to
make our men aoldieri than all the i:-eviewa, parades, and sham fights, with which
General McClellan amu11ed a co110try whose life and national honor were e.11 the
while ebbing away.
l have 110w exbauRted theeev~ral rMaon, alleged by General McClellan in excuse
for his long delay, from A11gust, 1861, to April, J 862. I h!lve shown that there ii
nothing in th811e exc,ueee, whether drawn from tba condition of tbe roada and tht
tea•on, or Crow the strength and discipline of our own o&rroy, or that o( the rebe\a,.
to jusl.ify it. No, no l Not &)I the shallow devices wh.ioh a year of afte1·tliought
can bring to the extenuation of military incapacity can either explain or e~culpate
that fatal delay which gan the rebels their best ally, Time; whioh made t he timid
among us deepair, and the proudest hang their beads with shame; and wh;.b
almost' authorized foreig n reoogoition of the rebellion by our ~eeming inability to
put it down.
,
V.

" MY FLAN AND YOUR PLAN." ,
Wheth er General McClellan euer would have b een ready to advance on the enemy, is a problem the solution of which is known ool y to Omni11Cien~e; bu~ the spell
•Ibid. p. 111.
t1''1nl year or 1be War, p . 178.
iPrlll:e de JolllYllle oa Ille Army of\be Polotnao, p. lot.
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"1118 at length broken, not b:v the motion
.McClellan, t;at by a word of initiative ·
11ttered by Uie President. On the 27th of January, 1862, Mr. Lincoln issued "Gen,ral War Order No. l," directing "that the '.l2d 'day of F~bruary, 186'.l, be the day
ior a ge11eral movement of the land and ninal £trees of ~be United States againlt
I.he insurgent force&''
As the reason for ordering a "general movement" on the d•y indicated may not be
aniversally intelligible and baa frequently been made a matter of wonderment by
General MoClellan'a partisans, a word ou that bead willlnot be out of place. Shortly
,fter coming into command of the Ai-my of the Potomac, General McOlellan began
IO urge that all the armies of the Union should be put nndet the direction of a
'single will" In his letter of Oct-ober, 1861, addressed to the Secretary of War,
'11'8 find him urging this with the 11tmost emphasis, and even malting it an indi8Pe11,sabl1 condition of any«duancd by th, ,frmy of ti¥ Potomac.•
Aotion, on any terms, being the supr,me l'lesire of the Government, General Me•
Olellan waa, on the 1st ot November, inverted with the ciontrol of be armles of
;he United States as Oeoel"al-in-Ohief. Bewilderi ng though one findathe retrospect
of aucb impo~oce of ambition as inspired this man to take on his pigmy ehonlilere
a burden which a colossus like Napoleon never attempted to bear-the task of U
onoe pereotlally directing t.he operaiion of an anuy of two hundred thousand men
in an acth-e campaign, and superintending the advance of half a dozen other &'I'•
mille ari•ayed a'long a froni of five or six'thouaand mil-i~ remains, nev-erthele"", a
/114t of history.
Having been vested with the oootrol o/ all the arrniea of the Repnblie, General
- )lcelellan cooOl'i ved the plan or a nnndt~teuiuamianc, of all these forces-a plan,
which considering that the eeveral armies were, as I have eaid, distributed alo11g
, a Ct'Ont of five 01• eix thousand miles, wiLb lines of operation running through difl~t·
dnt climate, an,\ varying weather, was ae impossible as it WM puerile. At the wav.·• of • the baton ol the mighty maestro the whole Yaat orohestra WM to s~rike up.
Until then, let all men hold ther.i peac&I In a word, we have here the first draft
of "-at. famous ~anaconda'' 81.ralegy, which planted a dozen dilfereoL armies on 1111
many linee of operation, all on the exterior circumference of the r ebellion, leaving
\he rebels the enormous advantage of their iotel"iorpoeitioo and giving theni'ample
\ime fortify dt every point.
. ·· 1 •
'
"
Aud it WM in view of this favorite plan of General .MeOJellan for a rimultaneuu~
..dt1ance along the whole line that the above Executive order directing a "general
movem.ent" on the 22d of February was i~ ued.t
An ,ul,,am:~ having at length been decided on, it remained to dete1111ine the li1'4
by whieh this advance should be made, being in mind the double objeotive of-1st,,
,lie rebel army at Manassas, and 2d, the rebel capitlfl, Richmond.
His q11.;te certain that up to November General .McOlellao held no other Yiew of
• forwa~d movetnent than a direct-' advauce on the enemy before him. At what
,ime and-by what counsels he altered his mind in thio regard are Roinle en which
we have no information. Dot a change of pnrpoee had m~aotime taken place, a ud
,vben the-'Preeident, fout: daya aft.er the promulgatioll df this General Order for an
~v11nce, ieeued Specinl WAr Order N o. I, directing II flanking movement on the
reb~l po&ition &t ManassAS. it immediately appeared thllt he and General McClellan
b11d different •iews' in regard to the line of operations to be taken op.
Again.vthis prop4ition Oeoeral McClellan set bis face with a determination much
1touter than the logic which he employed to s1:1pport that determiut.ion. Having
obta.iued pemiieaion to submit hill objections to the plan, we find a long letter from
bim adllreeeed to the Secretary of War, under date of Febru,.ry 3,t lo which the
q uesi.ion of the comparative ad vaotages of a movement on the enemy at Manassas,
or a transfer of hie army to a base on the lower Ches"peake, is elaborately dsacossed. Thia ia a problem of capital importance, and ao l ehall enter with &01H fulnel!a into -the analyaia of his reasooiog-eudea vonng not to omit a single point of
any weight or value.
At tbe outset of hi& diseua&ion of a movement on the enemy at Maoaeeas, by the
rebel right llonk, Genel'al M0Clel111n makes certain admi&siooe as to the advantages
of eueh an attack, to which I call the particular attention of the !reaper, for I
regard them as.decisive of the whole question as to the comparative advantage of
an attack o n Maoaseas, or a transfe~ of base to any point on the lower Chesapeake.
He admite tbat a.u. at i...ck on the rebel right flllnk by the line of the Occoquan would

• Rep0rt. pogo 07.
"
t G<!ner•I Mo<'lelt~lt"h•rl prmnloed. tr made Gen~r•l-ln-Chlef, to ueume the oO'e n~lve before tb&
Z th of November. I need l,ardly u y lhal thb prom!"' WU ... IIUle kepi as all bl• Olb6r•,
l &.:port, PIii"" '3-48.
ff

\

11
"prevent the junction of lhe ene"U''e ri~ht with his centre," affording the oppotuni tv of tf,,;"ro,inir the forme,r ; ,rnuld "remove the obttruotions lo the navigation
.oi the }'.o~omac ;" w,;>nld 'reduce. the l enghth of wa~uu tran•p<>rtat.iou;• aud would
'' 3Jr/ke 'J,rq·tly al /,is main· Tailwuy comm1inicatio1t,"
a,,,uu,ilg the successful execuliou of this plan wbat would have been t.be result I
Let General McClellan answer himself:

tt,,

• , "Alleuml11g,1he •uocc!s bf Ible operal\t.>n, &nd
deleot of tho encmy, ag ctrtatn, the question
al n11r, or1-•·• o.• to
lmportance or tho re,"lt• gained. I 1biok thcoo reaull! would be conftood
10 the """"'""ion or lh• ft,ld MbaiUe, lhe e•ncuallon ortbe line or the upper Potomac by the enomy, amt tl10 moral olfucl of lbe •lcLOrr; lmpor!aftt reaults. 11 is true, but not decisive or (be wu,
no• ••curln11 Ibo deotroollon or lb~ enom)"e r..10 army, for ho could r.11 back upon olh(ll) poslUon1,
and ftgbL 11$ aiain a nd again, abould Ibo coudlllou or bl1 tr1>op• )lermlt."

u,,

A. tacUcal vietol'y in the field, the compulsory retreat of th-e enemy frolD bi& ~bu.
ielfed' ))011it.ion, tbd l'elief the bloo'lcade or the Potomec, and the "moral e.fw:t efJhe
•ictory," with the losses, di~aeter•, and dernoraJiuUon that w ould have b een inflict•
· ed on them-all of wbioh General l!eClellan admit.a were \titbirt bis g,up, by the
moveme1,, indicated-were sorely well worth the efforL Why, consideri11g
whnt a pr1celese bnon each R reault would have been at tha.t time, the whole nation
wou.d ban called him blessed I But. it would not hJl-ve 1>%n "decisive of tbe war''
-nch WM the wildly puerile am bi Lion that po,;tt.,..ed him; and in ord,ir to end the
war, he reaolved to seek a tbel\lre where it WH peofeaUy evident b eforehand 110d
b ooame a aad matter of fact aft~rwerd, ~hat he would 6od all th<1 obst.aoles there
w ere at Ma,u- with none of it.a advantages.
This theatre of war wa.~ some poiot on (h., lower Chesapeake bay, either U,bana
on the Rappahannock or ~•ort Monroe. Tbe advantages of t his baee, nccordin~ to
Mc'Olellan'a reasoning, ie that "it affords the shortest pogsible land route t.o 'Rich•
mood, str iking directly at the heart of lhe enemy'• power in the East," aod that
"the road3 in that Tegion ar• pauabk at all ~cuo,n of IM year."
•
It is !m tllu dwr1nom a.•8umptio1l that Ii, lxuu the ,ohole plm• of c'am,paign f He
proposes to embark his troops at Alexandria, go down the Chesapeake bay, and-op
the Rllppahaonook to .Urbana, or down to f'ortrell8 Monroe, with the view of lhere
fio<ling a passage lo Richrnolld, where the roods would be •· pa.'!llsble nt all sea.sons."·
Ii is hard to tell woere to begin a usweriog utatem~ot like t'bad IIowdid be know
the roads tber& were "pMl"able at all sea!Oosf" [t would certainly be olltural, to
eohelude, fro~ the mere phyeical geogra1>hy of the r egion, that the roads are not
"pusable at t 11 98/\'<lM." We bave there precisely the physioal conditions to
mak~ im11a.dabl~ r ua,l,i.-a r~gioo on the draioag11 and "divides" of rivers, where
th-, 1tream1, loeiog their force, epread out in swamps and boga. Bui ii, going b.yo11tl t beorijtical 001,siderntioos, G~u~ral :\tcOlellno bad t ~lo:en the t rouble to look M
tbe map, he would have noticed, on the mnrch of fifty tnile<i from Urbana to Ricllmond, the "Dragoo Swamp." sod half dozen other awaml)II, besidea the Pam.unky
tbe Matapo11y, and the Chickahominr, 0,1 th;; Penioeula we need not say he wcmld
h uv4, found; <ve k11ow wlrnt he did find. Tt i• ,h.lancLoly to think t hat tbe fate of•
a Chrnr,aigo ~hould be intrlll!ted to • mind cnrable of ,ueh atnpendous aesumption11,,
T1te fa, t of the m .. tter i, AhOli lfri,•• tni11d llad already broken. d016n bef~ tlu
p_robltm given lti,n to solv•, "i8 coumg• hr,d l><Jzed ,mt, ancl ., ., t!.io, moo<l I•• toa11 ,oillittg
di look anyicl~r•, anyll!h,..• au,ay from th• t,.,,k IH,fore him. But it wa11 not long b~
fort be practically demonatrated th..1, in t rausf.,rrio~ hi" bMe from W a.sh.ingto.ll r,o
the lo~er 'O heaapenke, he merely •hift~d. trntdld not remo11<1 the difficulty. CalMn 1uii,,.u11• 11mta1<t 1,wi tra,u mare currunt. Jo l!'u11oinv; ·' ocro,11 I.he sea," indeed,
he chitnged hll' "sky,' hut oot the wk imposed cpon bm Jt atill met him io the
face as kuouy and more knotty than before. lt iqaa with a quite prophetio conl!cloueneas of this fact· thnt Pre.ident L,noolo, on the same day u11 that on wbiob
l}.,neral MoO.,Uao's letter is dated, aeoi to him the following note:
E=UT1v,a ?,l.u<StON, W ",&llh'<GTON, Fibr«al'// a-, 1862.
M:r Du• 81&: You and I h&ve dl•tluct sud dllreronl plans for a movement or the Army 9f u,e
Potdmac. Youro to bl done by tbe Cooaapeake, up tbe Rappnhann<iek to Urbana, •nrl •~.,o•• laod
on the York river; m)n& LO mqve dlroctJy w a l'Oinl on 1be rail-

: ::~~:i~n~,!~;.~; ~:..

tr y,>u wilt ,i;lv~ ••tl0Cac1<>rf •o••era 10 lbe following queotions, I ebAU gladly field my plan l<I

youro:

l. Does ML your plan lovnlo a greatly larger ex()Codituro or time &Dd 1M1. .lf lban mlue?
2. Wberein Is a vlctyry .,.,,,.. «rtai.ft by your plan than ml11eY
8. \','heroin Is a victory more 1>alualll• by your plall cbau mine!
I n fact, would II not be ZUs votun~le lo lb)•:. tbat 11 would brealr no great line of the enemy>,
eommnnlcallon, wbtle mine w o1tld ?·
6. In case or dlsaot&r, would nol a relteat be more dll!lcull by your plan than mine?
Yours, truly,
Al:IIU.UA.U LLNCOLN..

-

..

The sagacity of tbeee queries is o.ot ltlSi! oonJ1piouous tban tbe compendiou• coia-
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p!etemess w'it~ wbieh ' th~y cov;r Uie ,;h~)e. ground. They were ueve,:: auswned,
!limply l;>ecause they were and are unans"l'era.ble. ' But President Lincoln, feeling
• lbe weight' the tbaxitn, ·t hat a general will do better following an inferior plan
•hich is bis own than a superior'one which is the conception of another, and, above
&II, desltous that 8om.e move should be ma~e, and willing to sacrilj.ce any minor c~neideration to tha~ end, allowed General McClellan to have his own way.
That general and bi& partisans ha,,e a great deal to say abou~ the k\1pposed interfei:epce on the part of the authorities afWashington w1t)1 his plans and purpo~a,
and no opportun'ity is los~ to give cur,repcy to ,t~e·notion that it w11s the 1ntermedciling of a species of" Aulic Couecil "·at Waehingt<fn which caused those failures
vhich a juster·criticiem is compelled to lay at the door of hie own military incapacity. This subterfuge will no longer serve, forlthe evidence of·.hla ow.n report, :when
oarefully collated, utterly explodes .this claim. H la a fact worthy of note that the
illtestigations of1mo.dern Getman historians ban oooeluaively prond, t.nat the ·..,Ito•
peration, which an intense partiaanship •cast upcn the Austrian Aulic Counei~ and
which has passed into and long held a place m the acceptance of history, is ite.!lf
utterly without foundation, and some degree of historioal justice is now done a
body which bade fair to enjoy a maligned immortality. But i.t needs no nice historical criticism to show that the shallow claims of the eame sort, put for,h to extenuate .McClellan's blunders, are even more baaeless. If the Frosident, as the Conetitution~l ~end of the army, is blam_eable ,in any 'aspect of hie dealings with th~t
general, 1t 1s because he abnegated h1m1Jelf too much-<!Urrendere.d too .oiuch of his
• own authority, aud 'gave into the ha.nde of an uni ried man a power ·little ,s hort of
. the despotic. Wh.ile history will recognize that the actuating.motive in this was an
unselfish aod patriotfo desire to leave General McClellan untrammeled liberty.'o f
action, it ie questionable whetbe1· it will not at th~ same tlime condemn the President's surrenaer of his own convictions.
·
But while General McClellan was making hie preparations for the withdrawal of
hie army to Annapolis, be was saved ail further ,trouble ou this bead by a movem_ent
on tlie part of the Confederates, no le11S startling than their retirement from their
fortified position at Manali8ae and on the Potomac.
The withdrawal of the rebels from the line of Manaasa,, Centnville, and the
lower Potomac began in February, was completed on the 8th of March, a nd became
inown to General .McClellan and the Oabinet o.n the following day. The aetio.n
taken by .McClellan on this event was most extraordinary. In place of sending a
ltght movable column to take up a p1·ompt pursuit of the rebels, with the view of
harassing their rear, he waited tiU II/JO days after their definite withdrawal, and then
instituted a general movement of the whole army, not with any adequate military
view, Bild with no pu_rpose of attempting to make up with the rebels, but, as he
eaya, for the purpose of giving the ti-oops "an opportunity to gain i!Ome exp~rieoce
on the march and bivouao preparatO'T"'!J to the campaign "-a kind of education of
whick, ttuly, tliey stood in great need."
To,any commander not hopelessly wedded t~ preconceived Idea, the withdrawal
of the rebels from Mana&!as beh.iad the Ra)'lda.n, before a. eingle rnan had been
ahipped for the new base, would hav03 sugg ested the wisdom aud eveu the n.e temty
of a chtt:nge o~ plan. ,All th e conditions under which the purpose of a transfer bf
the army to Urbana or the Peninsula was for,;ned were changed by that evjlot: The
eardinal conception in making a flank movemeut,by water was th~ hope which
General McClellan eJ1tertained of being able to reach a ,poin~ on the line of"retreat
of the rebels or to reach the front of Richmond before tbey (IOUld""-cireumstances
11.Dder which they would doubtless have given battle with great disadvantage.
The move oi the enemy ought to have suggested to General McClellan that,
whatever their purpose was, it was next to certain that they would be in force to
meet hi!1! at whatever point of the coast he might choose to land. It should have
1nggested to nim that all oppo1·tu'nity'of making an offensive manamvre was. now
ai end, and that all he could now hope to do was to make a transfer of base.
It suggested to llim nbne of these things.· It &imply suggested to him to ehaoge
Uie propo~ed coast expedi~ion. To make Urbana,, pn the Rappa!iannock, after' tlie
rebels had retired behind that river, was out of the question, for if he might ho)?",
under eoqer of the rlavy, to effect a landing, it would certainly not be possible for
him to debouch froB'.l his
of qe,b11rkatioo. Under these c1roumstauces the line

or

• The Prince de Joinville calls Ibis movement to Manassas and back 11gajn " a promenade "-a
ll'OOd name for tt, bu~ Lbe. mos\ st)usoJegs and a1.mle &!t ,, promenade,, ever concel ved by a g ~o e:ral

iii lhe m\d•I of aclua~ war. The •· proo,~nade" gave the acldiers an OpJ)O!'tunity of seeing for
~beme~lve• lhe pitiful obstacles of quaker /[UDO and oue ,hor,e uoarme<I earthworko Jhal had ,o
!Hg atrigb!Ald tbe soul of their general. though ttte experience we are eure, did not come hl)me
ll>lbooe brave men wilho11t profound mor\i6caUon a,ad dl•:1111..

,.

•

t

of the Peninsnla-wbicb be bad before spoken of as oae promising "less celerity
and brilliancy of r115nlt,'' and only to be aaopte1 in case "the worst came to the
worst "-remained;• and this he immediately chose.
But I shall &how that this decision was made under circumstances that. brought .
him into direct conflict with the President's most explicit ordel"! touching the safety
of Washington, and in palpable and most inexplicable violation of the condition&
which the council of corps commanders adjudged essential to any movement by the
line of the Peni.nsttla. I shall, further show that this decision forms the initial
point of all his subsequent disasters in that hapless campaign.

V'I.
McCLELLAN'S ORIEV,ANCE-T~E DETACRMENl' OF McDOWELL'S CORPS.

While Mr. Lincoln was disposed to waive his judgment with regard to the stl'll'tegic merits of the two plane of advaoce on the enemy, he by, no means felt at liberty to permit General McClellan to proceed in the execution of his movement by
water without placing him under ,uch conditions as should remove as much as _poesible the danger of an assault npon the capital by the enemy. A'Dd yet even here
be did not undertake to decide· as a military man, upon the force which might, bie
necessary for the safe~y o,f Washington, but referred that question to the concurJ'ent
opinion of General '.Mcc\ellan and the f\>Ur Generals in command of the foor army
corps into wqich the Army of the Potomac had been divided, ~imply stipulatiag
\ that no cb,ange of base of the Army of the j>otomac should be made without
leaving such a force in aud about W asbington u ehould leave the Capital,entireJy
eecu1·e, not merely in the opinion of General McClellan hi.meelf, but
the opi11i~
also· of all tlte four Generals in command of the four anny corps constituting tlw
army.• Thi! obliged him' to hold a eonferenc~ with ,these commanders, in the
course of which tbe;y consent,lld to the proposed movement by..,the Peninsula on UT·
'tain tpeciji,; cornlitiom, to which I invite the p,u-ticular attention of the read,-.
They are as follows-to wit:
,
1

i••

lal. That the enemy•• Ye.eael H•N'ffll/Ul can be neutralized.
•
2d. Thal lbe means or \ranaportati?JI, ,eufflclent for an Immediate trallf!fer or lbe force to na n base, can be ready al Wa.b\ngton ana A)exa11dria to move down the Potomac; and
:·y~~;1~::;a1 auxiliary force can be bad lo allepce, or ai~ I~ slle1Jcing, the e?emy'• batterlee
0
9th. 1hat tbe force be le(t to cover W oablngton &ball be encb aa lo give an enllre feeling of eec,a.
rlty ror Ha t;afety from menace. (Onanl,mous.)
,
Ir. Ir I.be foregolllJ cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the
Rappahannock, al the earliest possible moment, and lbe means for coMtrucllng bridges, repairing
railroads and •toQl;in,11 1bem wiLb materials sufflcleni for oupplying 1he army, should at once be
collected for both lbe Orange and Alexa1,1drla and,Aqula and Blcl,t.mond Railroad•. (Unanlmou..;)
N, B. Thal wllb the forts on the rlghL bank of the Potomac fully g,irrlson•d, and those on the
left ban~ occupied,~ covering forco,,ln frptJt of\be VirginiaJlne of 115,000 men wouldsuO!ce. (KeyM,
Beln1zelmanand.111cDowell.) A .total of. 40,000 men lor lhe·<lefenceor the city would suO!ce .
.(iwnaer ,)
, 1
1,
,
,

..

~n ~he interp~etation of these opi.nioos of the corps command.,\.~ 'it must necessarily be supposed that the three Generals who concurred in opinioo,'intended that
all the fortifications around Washington should be" manned "Ol" "occ\·pied," and
that, over and above this, th ere should be a distinct unit of force capable of ,being
moved, o_f twenty-.five thousand men. As three of the1Generals concurred in this
opinion the opinion of the fourth may be thrown out of vi.ew, although it is not C8"·
tain whether his opinion was intended to apply to a movable force over and above
the garrisons, or to include the garrisons i11 his eetimat,s of forty thousand men.
It is evident that the opinion of tne three agreeing Generals was for ?ifoClellan
the regulating opinion, with which he was bound to comply in carrying out the
order of the President.
Now it is remarkable that, in October, when he contemplated a forward mov.. ment, he estimated the force neces&ary to be left in and about Wasbington, at thirty·
five -thousand men; and this, be it obeerved, when the proposed movement contemplated lhe presence of the m11in body of t)le army in front of the Capital, avail~
tn its protection and defence. If .this force of thirty-five thousand ;men was deemed
necessary by General McClellan, as the proper garrison of Washington, when tile
wliole army was expected to betengaged in front of the Capital, much more wonld
this force be necessary -when the proposed movelllent looked to the removal of ~be
main body of the army to t~e Peninsula, far beyooa the possibilit( of being imme• President's Qeoeral War No. 8, Reporl, p. 58.
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tiiauly anil11ble for tbedefeoceo( Wuhington, should the movement• o{ the enemy
tadanger th<! CapiteL
•
The conclusion is il'reaietible, therefore, that General 'McOlellao wl\8 b11ond by the
P resident's 01·der to leave, u the garriN>n of the fort• around' Wa•hinglop, not lest1
~an thirty the thousand men; and over &nd above this a moV11ble anit of fo~,
or, in other worde, an &rmy of twenty-five thousAnd men, without t1tking into con••iderAtion the troop! nee-ary for the defence of Baltimbre or Harper's Perry, or
the guards along the Potomac, both abo,,e and below Wuhington; for the garrilODt neeet1Ury for these places were all estimated for ,eparatelJ' i11 hi! report of
October, 186J.
ft ia plain from this etatement, the verity of which is matter of official record, that
when General McClellan r eceived lhe or~er of the 8th of March, and bad obtained
the opinion of the four Generals, u ju9t stated, hi, firat dllty '"'" to comply with the
Prt,i<knfa ordtr aa a conditipn prior lo i~~•ing any OT/UT Mm11elf in juTt/14ra1u;e of
kit plan of a •campaign on the Ptnitmda. Ile should Iii-st have deeignated the
troops nece.aary for the security of Wa11bington, not accordi"g to his own in01vidual judgment, but in conformity with the opinions of the four Generals, or of the
ibree which concurred in opi nion. Hie next point of duty was to consider wh~ther
1
bi8 remaining force, 11fter deducting the force d eiignated for the security of Washington, woald be such as to j ustify hi1'Q JD unde1 ta kin~ 11 campaign by his proposed
line: and if he thought it wee not, it tl)(II hia plain duty to rtpre,ent tl,e ca,e lo th,
Pr•lident bt/oTe giving atiy ordcr1, having in view hi& proposed campaign,.
It General McClellan had taken this coul'!!e, wl,ieh both candor And duty 'required,
be would hAVe been epared tha painful position of being in the wrong 10 the coofilet which eneued, con@equeot on the necessity which nie con,duct bad devolved
upon the President, of 11:Jaking good his own orders, after General McClellan lefi
W aebinjlton for the Peuinsulll, for it was not until after his defa•·ture that the President became acquainted with the fact that, should McClell&n a orders be carried
out, bis own expreea orders would be dieobeyed : that is, Washington, or the fortifieations around it, would not be manned as required, in' the opinion of the ih'ree
General@, nor would there be a covering ar.m:V o( twenty-five tliousand men, aa
required by the same opinion. On the contrary, it was disoovered that the amounl
ofl'o rce let\ in And about Washington, and in front of it, at Warrenton and at other
point&, fell ahoTt of twenty tltomand .vum, most of them being new troops, and thou!(h
aot dieorganized, they were by no means organi_zed, a& wu clearly el\l; forth in official siatemcol.91 and the force fell sb.,tt numerically of that which he waa required
to lene by eome forty lhousaod m~n I•
•
Noi, as l lJavti snid, till aft, r General McClell&n'e departure did the conS<!quence
of bi6 di.i11genuow conduct, which ltft the Capital of the nation in a conditiou
a lmo,t to be tak~n by a o.ingle ump th matn, becowe appare)IL Jt. then bees.we
.:he l'reeident'a imperative d1tty to take measuree to secure the end whieb ~eoeral
McClellan hi.d so groJ$ly peglected, a11J ,he did so in the following order :
..ANUTMn'-GJDr&&.U/e Owrcx, April 4. 186'i.
By direction or 1be Presldeal, General McOowell' • army c&rp& bu been de1acbed rr<>m the
foroe nuder your irumedlato command, and 1bo Geocrul i• ordered to rnporl to lbo <Seeretaey
or War. L ell•r by mail.
L. TIIO:.IAS, Adjutant-General.
Qc11eral MeOlellaa.

Jf the ~xrosi iM already gi•en ha.• the force and the truth, and the force of
t ruth which t Lhink belo11g to it, it wi)I haTtl b~en macle apparent tbat it was
General McOlellan'11 own neglect of lhe command of the Pret1ideut, embodying
\ha opioiou& of the Corps Commanders, that drew UJ?On him the consequences,
-wbat.tver they were, of the above order for the detention of McDowell's Corps-an 01 der whiob was iuued for no other reason than because General llfcClel1110 had
failed in bis duty, ,md thereby, in the judgment of all men, .the foots being
known, JVU preclud~cl from all right of comment upon the Pre!ident's order, and
Ile bimiself mw;t be belJ respoo!ible for whatever coo.sequtnc~ r e9ulted from that
order.
1 ~1a!e this simply to eetkbl!sb thP r,lio~iple in fbe C&.!!e; but I shall, in the
"eqnel, demouMrale that the con,equ~1,ces or McDow~IJ•s detention were by nu
meau• a~ w11wrti.ut M G,rneral McClellan i8 disposed to alle~e, b~cliu~e, of th~ three
divisions of McDowell's Corp6F1·anklin'e was sent to him immediately, nod McCall's

•

• Ir General MoClellan made 1b" Olli and ralr rtJ)Ott or all Ille lranu,llooo or 1bis period which a
decent resf."!'I ror the tru1h or blolOr) demand., h~ ..,ould have IIUl<llled al 1hl• poiol the reJ)Orl lbe
General 'l lodoworth, Mlllrary Governor or Wa&)llnglon, ou the •trenglh and condition of Ille for<e
leJ\ tor lhe deroncu <>ftbe ('ap!Lal-a dooument which wus cortaloly acce•sible lo biw. H will be
found a1 p. 81G ( Vol. 1) or the Reporl on 1he 0onduc1 or lhe War •
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in e.mple time to pe.rticipe.te
the be.ttlee before ·Richmond; I ebe.11 demonetrate
that, had McDowel'e entire Corps been sent to him at the time that Franklisi'a division was forwarded, General McClellan coq)d hav, mad.e no W!e of it, fOt" reUODs
which will tppear at the proper time; aod 1 shall deroomtrate that, McDowelf•
force at Fredericksbnrgh wu quite aa useful Lo General McClellan as it would have
been if aent to him, since ikl presence threatening Richmond called off an equal por-tlon of Lhe enemy's force, which he would otherwise have had in hiof front.
Another point must here be exp,lained, having some connection in General McClellan's mind, with the action of the Preeident in the detentioi/ of McDowell's
Corps, and it ie this: There was among the troops in front of Waablngton, constituting a portion of the Army of tbe Potomac, & dvieion of about eleven tbousaad
men, under the command of O~neral Blenker. ' SfiorUy before Lhe departure of Gen
eral McClellan for the PeniDllula, the Preeident had a personal interview with him,
in which he eicpreaeed his dyire to ~end that division to what W&3 called tbe Mountain Department, in bfiddle Virginia, with tile view of enabling Genet·al Fremont to
move a co--0per11ting column in conjunction with the advance of the army of the
Potomac. Genei;al McClellan was opposed to the movement of that division, but
finally acquiesced in it.. In_ his allueion to this interview with the Preeident, Gen·
era! McClellan at.ates that the President ~eured him no further reduction of hia
army destined for the Peninsula should be made; and he then rerert to the order
detai11ing McDowell's CcifP.S aa a violation of the expressed promise made by tbe
President.
·
'

"TJ,e l'reet~nl," ..,-, be, "bavln,r promlaed, in Ml lnlert'I~,. follo,.lng hi• <>tder' ~f Jdareh 81.
withdrawing Blenker•• d1"'41nn 0110;000 men &om my comm,nd, Iba\ nolblog of lbe ..,,, 1bould
be repealed-lb\ I mlgl11 reel &$$ured that the campal,rn ohould proceed, wllh no l\1rtber dodu~
Ilona from the forM n~ which Ila op'eraUoo• ·h<ld been planned, I tMOl/ CQ1lftlt to l,a~t,u; bu,,

,lwcJu4<t$tllu~,•e14.•

"

lo this "nne fi:enzy " there ie a aad want of ingenn11u9 ~I.Atement; for Genel'ftl MeClellan knew, be could not but have Jj:oown, that the.promise reiened to must have
been made by the Preaident, tDitk t/11 implicit understandi•tg the« Iii, oiDn order•
to..ehi,tg tlie ,ecuruy of Wiuhinplot• ,-de/ be carrud oot. The President placed too
much I eliance upon General McClellan's eense of duty and propriety to intimate
a doubt 88 to bis faithful obedience to his very pointed and written ordere, looking
to the .eecurity of the capital. Under these circumstancee General McClellan bad
no right to appeal to the promise of the President, except in terms of humility for
the attempt to practice a deception apoa the high functionary who made it, whose
relations to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac waa neceesarily of &n coofideolial a character 88 to make the utmost candor on the part of the subordi.aate
a duty of the firet importance; for it cannot be expected of the Chief Magistrate of
a great people to watch with jealous sus_Piciou the chief officel'tl in c!ommand of his
armies, !eat they should deal covertly with him in their execution of hie proper orders. Jf an evasion of duty ie an offence of the mo~t ~hameful char&cter in any
~ubol'dinate lowatds his superior, utterly aubver,ive of all di-,cipline in an army,
and d&!l1'11clive of its elficieney, much more is ibid 1< crime of the 6t'6t magnitude
in a general officer, on whose unity of action with the pur~ses of bis auperior the
euceess of an army almost entirely depend!'.
I now proceed to the consideration of tho other condition, the fulfillment o<
whfob was, in the opinion of the Corps Comwaoders. an essential prior to any movement by th~ line of. the Peoioeula. It is the following terms, to wit: "That the
enemy's 'Vel!8el, the Merrimao, can be nutralized." On this point tbe opinion ol
the CorpeCommandere wu unani,n<m3.
It is hardly conceivable bow General McClellan could disregard the warning of
bis four Generals on thie point, and ooderttlke hie expedition in epite of the know·
ledge which he must hillll!elf have had of the power of the Jforri,,iao.t Jt is true
that General McC)ellan drew from Commodore Ooldeborough a declaration that he
could ,ie-i.traliu the Jfrrrimac. But this opinion went no further, u Oenerel McClellan ought to have known, Lhat an aesurance that, with the aid of the Jfonitor,
aud of bis other navnl vessels, be could prevent the Jferrimac from leaving Elit~beth River, or, 11t all eve~ prevent her passing by Fortr&11 Mom-oe into Oheaa•
peake Bay.
•
But in order to do this, that is, io order to "neutralize " the Jfe·rr-imac, Gen.eral
McClellan must h&ve known that t/,e po,oer of (lommooore Ooldobor1>tigh totU it&elj
nttdraliied by lite Merri11UJC; so that ii WM impo<1Sible for the navy at Fortr888 Mon• Reporl p. llG.
t Tho wr1uen lnslnlclloos of the confederate navy departmeot to tbe commonder1 of the
Merrimac obow lhal h& wu under nrden to pus on1 bejond ForlreM Monroe and deairoy Mt>Olellao•a wkler \raneportallon to Oh11•ape•kO Uay.

"

roe to give General McClellan an:y eff'ectna\ aid, either on the Je.ip~ or York ri,vers,
dl'e presence of the navy, as ju~t 1ptim,ated, beipg nec~seary to :iyalch th~ JlemmJe.
]tis impor~nt ~o un~erstand, fully ,t~i~ st~ of tbiµgs, ,befafse General}tcC!ellao
l'IO!Jlpl,upe., 1n his Report., of the wan~ o't 8!61~tance from the na-.:y, whe'n, 1p point of
'1,ct:, he hd po right to count upon it, a~d would il.aT~ had' no ,1ght even i!liis four
~enera1s had noi warned hill! of the danger~ms power o( tbe'Men-imac. The navy
wa,i' doing all it, pqesibly could do in covering bis w11ter lin,e of commuuieationa, and
hild1no (orqe left with which to perform any otl(er wo,rk, Thia he ought to hav'e
known !'nd no doubt h,e did know it, .~nd h1p'\'e I ~ay hi~ cpmplainta on this bead
are not 1ngenous., They are the resort al\d tlie after-thought o( a defeated Genera\,
whose failure was due to himself; but who liae ao'"ugbt in this so-called" Report"
1
to thtow the responsibility upon-others.
'
The reau)t of this reasoning ie, I think, to lahow tllat not on_e of the Cl)nditiona
defined ~y the cbunc'il,qf Co,rpe <;,omm~n1lrs u easentiale, prior ~ , ~he adoptio11 of
the Peninsula route, wu complied .w~b'. by General McClellan. ' He neither lef\
Waahington secure, nor secureii the 'ri~ilt,-'alization of the Merrimac, nor secured
the co-operation of the navy. In absence o( these requirements, his plain dut,Y'wae
the adoption of the other alternative ~reed upon by the Corps Commanders In the
£0!10 wing .~ rma : "If the foregoing cann,ot be, t~ army ali;<>uld thffl be m~ed agaiMl
t~ enemy behind the ~appahannock at the ea4'1st pouible 111-0'mfflt." But this General McClellan did not do. " He had determidflrto move the army to the Penillaula,
and in cloing so, he took upon himself the responeibillty of all the results that gre',IJ
ou~ of bis disobedience of orders.
·
•'
f ll~· y'<1u' "ii'~ presentfy see l!im tu_i;~ rpund , ap.d wi~ incredibie effr~ntery
charging bad fa1t.li. and the blame ,o f h,ia· fa1lu,• on $hO!!e he had th118 grolll'ly de~ved. Aud from tbatiday to this be ancl his following have made the ,withholding
of McDowell's corps hie great grievanc&-Athe-qravamen of all their chargeB against
the Administration-the convenient pack-horse on which to place that burden of
~efeat that will bear him down $0 a historio infamy I
,, ,,
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There is now, I. suppose, not the shadow o,f a dimbt ,tha$ had the Army of tpe
Potom'ac been simply allowed to ,oalk on up the J;>eninsµla, it w,ould have been, able
to·walk 01/n' all the force which General Magruder had to oppose it. 1tis nctW k1unm
· llow contemptible that force wa.., General Magruder's official rep<1rt• of hi11 opera•
t.ioJIII on the Peninsula shoJVS that his whole ar,m y coneisted of eleven tho118and
aen; of these,,sii: theusand were:usele&i to him, beil)g placed i.n garrison' at Gloutester Poh1t, Mulberry lsland, ew. "So that it will be seen," add3 he, "that the
balaMe c,f the line, embracing a Jengih of thirteen milee, was defended by about
;we t/lf/uiiand men."., What is now a matter of certainty was theu a matter of
shrewd _conje11ture. General Wool, whOili! positio11c at, Fort1·1tss M9nrof! gave him
every possible information regarding th~ ·enemy, -repeatedly ;epresented to Gene1·al
J 4~Clellan how trifling the rebel force was and begged him to push on before the rebels
abould have time to concentrate. J;>isposing his feeble force with admirable skill,
moving it a.b out from point to point, and futtfng forth the wiles and strategems of
war hec4ueeeeded in so ,frighteoirig G!)oera McClellan th!'t, after a single reeoonois•
saace, he sat down to-dig. •·To my uttel' surp1i~e," sayi General Mag,ru,der, "be
,pe1·mitted,da,y after day to elap~e without an assaµl$, In fl few days the object of
bis delay waa apparent. In every direel.ion, in (rout of our lints, thro'ugh the in•
t.ervening 'food$, _a\ nd along the open fields, ~artlw,orka began to appear.!' Of simi,•
Jar tenor ia the oonvereatj.011 reported by Col. Fremantle, of the Coliistream Guards,
who,met Gene,~l M11grud11r in :re~IIS lawt '!llmner1f '/,Efe. (M:,grµ·der). told me," he
.IIRYBi "the diffef,e µt dodges he, had, resorted 4>, to blind and deceive MqClellan as to
his str,ength; and he spoke of the intense relief a\l,d amusemeQt :witb which: be at
Jengtb eaw that General, with his wagr.ifi!\ent army;, f,egin to brenk. grcrund bejOTe
miurahle earthuxwk~ defended o,ily by 8,000 men"
.
Qrilllly amusiog tlioagh the retros~ec,t of such a speetacle is, it inyolves
a gr~at deal that is much too hV,mil1ati.ng to permit ,our entil'ely appreciating
it. Spirking the duty of moving on the rebels at M,an.aseas, Gen~ral McClellan
~ugb.t the Peninsula with the express view of making a "rapid and brillinnt" cam·
P,~ig~.. 1;lis first 11\easure in ~xecution of ~~is campaign is to sit d()wn_ before the
• Confederate :Report, or Balllea, page :;:;r.

t Three Montbau,

1he Southern Slatte.

\

ti:ve tl{ouaan-d rebels present.- to dispute hie progrell8, AU that: ean possibt,t, sav.e·tai&

from being,hereafte11 elltellmed a1bit of monatl'6UB burlesque, is.that it ie vouched fot
sy the irrefr11gab!I! evi$lence of hiewry 1'
. · ,
,
lf the. defell.8i...-e 1lioe which the rebels bad eonstructed across the Isth111u11; .from
Yorktown, aloog the line of the w,.rwick, was really a position of the en<lrmous
strength claimed by Genetal McClellan, I oan 011ly eay that he should have taken
thje ele,menhinto account when he determined on , bi,s,plah of campaign. It is a
Jame a11d impotant exc11&& for him to put. fo.rth that be did nof.;J..now the .tebele had
a fortined -position on the Penir;,sul~ thab,he 'IV~ ..who.lly ignorant of t.be nature of
the topog'raphy,(that .he wM ,noh1'\vare that the Warw,ick;river ran in the dit!ec!tion
it does, and that he found ,the.roads in horrible c!ondition. Be :was repeatedly
l'(>rewarned that he would find· (Qrtifioationa on, t~o, Peninaula: jnst aa wflil aa at Ma•
uaaaas; but, with, that ,extr&()~dinary levity of.mind l,Jlat•eharacterizea him, he inaisted 011 seeing,all l'O!!e-eolored inHlte. distan~ and, 1exe.tnplifyiog ped'eetly tlie
Latin ee,ying, 01tind1ignotum. pro tMg11ifieo, the leas he kne~ of the natute o( the
theatre of war·he was about to seek, (and ne after obnf66113d it wa.s an unknown re•
gion to him) th~ more alluremen.ts it had for him.
,
. Bat without d.enyillg that the poaition ,r,hieh the rebels held across the Isthmus
was one nq,turally strong, I deny utterly and alt.ogetber lhat that it presented
!ltlything whioh ne,ed have be,in 91\Y ooneiderable obstacle to the advance of the
overwhelmi-o g numbers of the Anny of the Potom- The Jine, held by the re~els
-the general line of t;he W,arwi<1k, whioh hw.da within , a mile of Yorktirnm-wae
!lefended by a eer~ of detaobed redoubte connected bf rifle-pits, and it was not lees
!nan thirteen milei in extent. Now,1all experience jrovee.t.hat a line so extended
is only formidable when the works are fully m,atine , and• t.bere is present, 1beeide,
I\ m,ovellble force, capal:sle o~ rapid conoe~tration at any'point the enemy may ~ssail,
The very length of euoh· a hoe becomes 1bl wea~eM; there must be aolne pornt at
w,hioh it can be (orocd; and this, onoe ,do.n.e, the w.orka beoome .a disadvantage,
rather than a d~f11oee. •
v ·
., ;
•
1 ·
On the point of the absobte necessity devolving upon Mc<:llellan to IIS$l1Ult· the
works at Yorktown, 1th11 mpi;nent,, b.e.reached 11ucJ, r~cop.l\oitered them, there is, indeed, no room fol' at·gument., .Any <0ne who' will insp.ect the map will see the read•
in!)eS with lfh-~cq U.e lia~ Rf the Warwick might have been forced, and, this 01100
done, Yorkto~n w11e nlnifd.\ And tbi, ,ie the proper place to mentiop an incide11l
touching the true 1detaila of w;qjcl) Ge,neral McClell.an).s w re.t icent llj! he always ie
touching anything which ,in t.hll•Qmallest degree t~s against himself.' One of the
division commanders oceupyiog a point where he knew he' could:fo~ce the e11emy'e
line, sent a portion of hi.a oommand,.ohiefty Ve.rmopt troops, to 'ON88 a dam whieh
~e rebels bad oonst,-u~ted, apd asMult thei1· posiiiou. This t.bey did, aud gallant{~advanoiog qnder heavy fire, actually took p088esaion of the rebel worka. But
ilhis -.yas: all contrary t9 General McClellan'it fa-,orite sy&tem of regular approaches,
and would have proved that the President's fecommendation to pie1·ce th~ enem~
).ine, instead of being "simple folly;" as McClellaµ, pronouuoed it, was the higheet
w~sdo,.u. U must have been for this reason-for there is no other to l;>e found-that
tll.6 brave fellows who had,,,be11i:i guilty o( this brilliant irr.egularity, were left utter,
ly without support,, ;uid were finally forced to fall back wlth sa·ious loss I I sup-.
p<>se there is but one mau in the world who will not now adtlllt that the "folly "
m the siege of Yo,·ktown reated, as it so o(ten does, exclusively where thr timidity
belonged-and that maµ 1.s G~u~1-al i){cCleUao.. And if it will add anyth1~g te ~e.
co::npleteness of this d~monstratio11 to say that the rebels Jlever expected to h9\d
Y 01·kt.own, we have their own testimony to that effect. ~fogruder rightly describes
t,be impression General McClellan's conduct produced when he speaks of the "intense amusement and delight with which he at length saw that general begin lo
b1·eak grouud before mieerable earthwork~ defended by a feeble force of eight thou•
eand meo."
.
But if the rebel force wae feeble at the outset and not in condition to offer any
ee'rious resistance to an even mode1·a~ly vigorous ~ttack, it was 'luite certl}il), that
it w~uld not long be a)lowed to remain so. The' eoem.)', fiodin~ unexpectedly tb'a t
they •ould hold the Arfily of the Potomae in check: until a sebo~darr, ll,efenaive
lin41 nea1·~r Richmoud could ije, prepared, would have shown s n inbec11ity rhich
t).i.ey have never displ~yed, had'the~ uot,1done so. T~~ .J;i\gTi proba~ilifY,, tba~ they

• Military hl•lory preeenl• ilo more formidable ·torllned line• than thooe of M~balgne artd Beu,
ob&in, and yel l,forlborough forced these, though defended l>~ ·a euperlor force, anil,if lb;. could
dime in the cue of 11oslt)ons hel<I. ,by a superior force1 wh•I pbJ/,11 l'{e uy,ot a , line held by
Ave lbousand agh10sl over a bWldred lhou...ud. The comp:r.lson, ill fact, Is as Judlcreus as II
would be lo compare 1tbe one 1eiieral with the olber'-I' mean, ·o r course·, a Marlboron&b
wiUl. a M.cl)lellan.,.
.
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would b~th reason and act in' tbie way seems to ba~e belm duly appreciated b,Y the
President, who ·communicated tbia impression to•General Mc(!)lellen in' numerous
dispatches, of which the f<'llowing of April' 6th, is a sample: u You :no,v ho.ve over
one hundred £bouaand troops wtth you, independently of Genernl .Wool's command.
I think you had better bre!lk the enemy's line from Y orli':towo to Warwick 11 ver a£
once. They will prllllably use time as advantageously you can." S!) /igain, tbree
days afterward: "By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he
will gain f113ter·byc fortificatio11s and reinforcements, than you can by'reiofot'<lements
alone." Never wM'ntterance more prophetic; for, says General Magruder, in bis
officio.l' report: "Through the energetic action of the (Oonfederate) govet·nmeot, r t it,force1ru1u, began to pour in, and each hour the Arlny of tbe Peninsula gre,o
stronger and atronger u~til a1n:iety p<Used from my ,mw.d M to the re~nlt of an attacl,,
upon us." With theee facts, it is submitted to the reader whether·we are not jueti•
lied ~n connecting by, the cl0$e8t logical hood of anleeedent and 'consequent this fatal,delay' and all the disastroue 'l"e&Ults of the eampa.igo on the"Peni/,lmla f
At leogtlt, after a' rriouth of delay', the rebel_g, whether ashamed of'themselves at
putting the grand Army of the Potomac to such unnecessary trouble, or beo1rnse the
position of McDowell'corpe at l<'t·ederioksburg became' too serious a/menace to Richmond, withdrew from Yorktown as secretly as they bad withdrawn from llfonMsl\s.
General McCJellari had ·eomsumed matiy weeks, including the whole mon~b of April,
in prep&riog to breacb the fort- at ·Yorktown. , It is impo.,.ible to sa,y hbw many
weeks more he ,would have,gone on digging and hauling, and it is a matter of record
that-he bad just sent.a reque11I. that tbe heavy eiegeguns in the fortifiC'!Ltions for t he
defence of W asnington altmdd be taken otd of their 'll){)'l"k& and shipped- to ltim,• when,
at length, the day aftet' the withdrawal of the rebels, he "discoverea" they bad
gonet Coming into poeeession of the deserted<position, he immedi11,tely asked if he
might il)!!<lribe "Yorktown" ,{ft) hie banners, and telegr&phed a dispatch which he
has forgotten to reproducie, ,to the effect the.t- he would :• pueh the enemy to the
wall." I need IIJrdly rem~rk th~t this ·' w11.ll" was never fou:lid; aad' we were
left to,exelaim ,wltb 'Pyfomus
,
·
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1 "Th~tt wall! 0,1 wa1i r 0, rrVfeei and lovely wall, 11
"
•,.
Show me,tby chink to blink tbrongb with mine ey_ne.», . '"' ·,

W~ she.U p'reeently follow General Mcc1,11an in hiseubsequentmovementson the
Peninsul!l; but' befo_te dismissing the consideration or the siege of Yorktown, we
must 'remark, in a word, that· we find ourselves nn&ble to accord to tlia~ mege the
.admiration which Genei;al McClellan challenges for it. W J are requested to admire
the thirty -or forty miles of corduroy road constructed by hi; army, the miles of
_trenches and rifle-pits opened, and the huge batteries plllced, ~one of which, by the
way, was ever allowed t<r open its fire. But we could admire the corduroy road
more, we.-e it not/ ac~ordin~ to Gener~! Mc(!lellan's own statement, 1a mere piece of
supererogat101:1-'the roods m that regt0n bemg "passabl~ at n.ll '8eas01U of lh• year."
We eould admire the •colossal digging and delving more, could we shut out th e
ghastly vl~ion of the thousands of lives lo3t by tbe epidemics of thA region ioto'
which our army had been led and the useless servitude to which it had been condemned, or push aside the spectacle of those ~rave fellows digging at once a double
ditch-La grave as well Ma trench. We could admire more tbe profiles of bis b85•
tions and his batterie~, did they nol irresistibly present themselve~ to our imagination as hage monuments of the folly of a man who, seeking the Peninsula to execute a strategically offensive eampa1gn, sat down, at the firat,show of resistance, to
a feeble.taettcal defensive.

'

VIII.
TflE PENINSULt..R CAMPAIGN.
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It now stands hi~torically determined that at the time the Army of the Potomac
landed upori the P epinsula; the rebel cause bad reached its lowest ebb, The splendid victories won by the Union armies in the West--armiea whose at·dor even the
-McClellan·policy, while it ruled, had not been able to restrain, and which, when
once freed from that incubus, sprang forth int<r glot·ious activity-had carried dis<:omfiture and. demoraliz!\tiou to the rebel ranks, terrqt· and dismay to tbe whole
populolion, and,fearful forebodings to the souls of the guilty leaders.
Aud while this WM true of the rebel cause and the rebel armies generally, these
influences wer~ also powerfµlly felt by tbe rebel army , in Virgini~. It must
be r~membered that this 'was before the passage ~ven of the first C9uscription Act,
and while t.be rebel army was suffering from the excessively defectiv.e military sys-

tem uniler which the "]~rov,i•innal Army" was organized.

l~ ,Winter at Manae-

&as haJ greatlv reduced i~ by iliau1.~ and Pxpiration of the tenQ of ~ervice of lhe
ane_yeur,tl'O?P~ 'a?d ~}iere j~ the b.~st, 0\·tdrvcg~ o,'~h~w t,hat ,it ~~e<it~d it~ wJth,d\•awi.l frpm Mall1lSRliS uuil c~ntrev11I~ 1,r,« c,,.. dttlOO of. ve,·y gr~at <lenw rnhz;i.t1011.

Uuder the~e e'ireut'.l)stanc~s: ~'h'ere is ha:r<lly the sbadow of a dou,bt that,· had the '
'i·ebels been promptly foJ)o'w /d up afte1· their retr~at beblod the Ral,)pi\hannoek_, pur
al'my would have e'utered.Richmo11d ou'
bed~ of a routed and dissol viiig mob,
1uld tul<en posaeAsidli of the I Capital wh1bli tb'J '''r.,bd leaders' t'heu expecte\i, w
a)>aiidon. .
.
r .., ,
, ,
,
,
In this state of facts, the1 Iiistoria'n finds b11psetr brou~ht face to1 fac~ 1with the
p\lzzlio/l problew of deterpiin.in'g)iow it happetis that, in the wor'd~ of
B.~RNARD,
'(s.te Repo~t ?{E!ine~r OI_Jerati~p_s,) 'j~he,date'of ~ll1 iniat,iop of1 ili~/i~mpaign ot
}h~s t11,~n.1fice!1~ I '1-rpy_
f9~?,1;na~, "!,8,S ~elM# of{tbe, ~esusc,t,fwe of t)>e re,~ 4
·cause, which see ~d ''toj g row strong pan .pl."', w1tli jl}ej sl~f. progre~s o( 1lii
operationst0 -~ ,,.j
J'- J • t
·
t''
~•
J , , ..
h
11
' Wbllt' the first favo,ring i'~tlu~nce 'was, Yf,e ne~d. b~ nt ~f loss' t,o;<fe~~rmine
The
ueexpected delay of the whole month pf AtJril befot·e 'forktown-tJ\e military
strength of which wa! ludi(l\·ouolfl\'iadequ..te to have 111·rested the" warch of i;mr
arrny, that it w,as l(!>ng qefore,the ~ep~ls \~uld . belie~e. t)le evidence, of tn,ei_r O'\\'D
•eyes'that McCu:Lt:.,\N had actually calle'tl a halt-gave the rebels ample tune to
look'ii:hntit them, tb fo1·m tlleifplans ~n4 'to' ~St' <ln foot their e'x:Jc11tioo. The fi,rst
fruit of this was ibe' Corieru·ip1iuu"Law, ,.,1,i~'J\1 1it it _be 9bser~ed, was eassed by the
' Confederate Cong1·eas at Richdio8ll"
the 16th ' day of Ap'ril, in the midst of
'll1qCtELLA,<'s Lragi-cb1:0edv qf J,he spaae befor~ 'J orktown; and this '}'.BS immedi(lteJy
followe,d by, ~he rlorga1'iiia~1on or the Cootederate army. Moreo'~er ' the bitter
manner in wh~ch tire deflats·of the West brought' hoxhe to' tbe Ie'adera the military
tDaxim that in attei\l~t!Hg to cover everyti1io~ one covers notb\ng, h'd :tnug\t
t~e,m ~h1e policy of c'o~i4~fitration, and they spe,1 9ily began its application' i~ Yir-
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'£be, 'effect or these ru~iii,ures wa·s, of course, not immediat'e i but Gen. 7>foCL£LLAN
delayed loiJg eno\l~h at various poiul(lo permit' their full 'dhelopmeut'. "Faulty in
sti·ategy though the truMfor .o f tbe army (o tfe 'Penj,nsqla musL be ·con,id~red
-fanh,y as involvinl:I a n'eeessary division foi-<;~1' n_n d' BO 'euormou7 WI\St, o( t,ime,
without eli111inaLlng or 'diminishing ' Jny of lhe,dltliculties of tl1e dh;ect'a,iYao<:4, bu~,
on the contrary 'exaggeratiog them all--JJevertbeless, considering the low ebb t9
which the 1·ebel'fortunea had su;.k, and the wink aha demoi·alized cond,t.ion" of the
rebel army io Virginia, at the initiation .,f the 'campaign oo the Peninsula, ~ e are
• warranted ~y tb~ f11cts .in s_aj·i'!lg tba~ a vigo:e11~ advafce fron Fortress Monroe
would have brough't,tbe Umon army 10to ·po~1t1b11 to fig.ht a battle for the posse&•
sio!l of Richmond, with the chaucea of success deci<L.:dly on oul' -side. This might
ilgain have been posJible, a month later, after the'bnttle of Williamsbnrg. ' It might
still have qeen llosslble another moulh lat~,· ,ii !;tie J,eels of Fair Oaks. )Jut it ,w as
reserved for Gen. MoCL'Ef.ui<; by a display of tlwid;ty and ioclisr,osition to act
amounting absolutely to diease, to weary and wear ouf the patieo0e of Fortu_n•
' till at length she ceased ti:> present any more golden oppo,tunities. . Whst wn>< poagible to us in April, wae no longer po,ssible ip Augast, and 'the force wliicb, a~ '11¥
now know, had abandoned Yorktown witholl't pl'ans of future ~,ctio.t,1, and whic'b was
driven out of Williamaburg, was able t hree months af~rward~thsoh to
McCL&LL-".N's considerate delaye-to 88'sume t he offensive and throw hia arruy pellmell bock in ai:iastr.ous reti·eat on, the J11mes. 1,,
•
But I ant.icipste. On the "discovei'V" oftl,ie withdrawal of the rebels on th~
morni11~ of the 6tb of May, Gen. STOs11:1iAN; wit~•his cavalry Corps and four ..t;i,atte,
ries ot' horse a,tillery, was sent in,pursuit;. Re ','f~ follow~d by HooxER's Divi~on
o f BllI>'TZllLMAN's Corp'!. Subsequently the divisions ofKllARNEv,.'Coucu, and CASIO'
(of Su»Ni<R'& Cor jl6) were ~eut forward. S:roNEMA'tj' came up, with the 'enemy's rear•
gua1·d at Willi•m~burg, where a def~nsiye,line ~a,d been thrown UR, which, ~ow,•
ever, i~ is evident, JonNSTON was not minded to hold,· since bis whole ' army had
p11S8ed beyo11d Williamsburg. lt ,vas 11,,!·efore, eirnply for..,th1 purp,o •e _of eecuring
the saf~ withdrawal of the. trains that the rebel 'rear turned sl'larply
on'S-roN&"1N at
Williamsbnrg; end; it being found t).H}t Union infaqtry' supports were co111ing up,
LoNGSTllEE;'s pivisioo w~s &etually ordered bdck to tllat point. Ut was between his
command nod the di visions of StfMN1m's aud H EllSTZELMAN's corps that, on the ,followiog day, the chide, ill-planned, unnece,;sary, but, for us, bloody encounter, ;vh'i'ch
figures in history as the b4ttle of Williamsburg, took place(
•w
Gen. McCLELLAN, in. bis' Report, skims this affair in a 'few vague touches-a fact
that might be aceounl,ed for from the circumstances th~t,, not having been' person-
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a)ly present at this h1is first ba,ttfo. be c~uld kn:w nothing of.it Ir~~ his own know)edge, were it not for the other circumstance, that there ii.re on 'r ecord diepatchee
revealing, on tbe part of Gen. Moe!.11:LLAN, motives j\nd moods of mind totally at
varianc11 with the representations of his Report. I do not affirm t9at tlie fact of
the~ being extremely dam~ing to his military pretensions could have anothing to
do with their omi$$ion, I simply submit to the consideration of candid minds to
determine what i~ the real motive of a historical deficit otherwise so unaccoUI1table.
'
Gen. McCnLLAN does not me'ntion1 when speaking of the colulllJl he "immedi,ate
ly" sent in pursuit of the enemy, that, had he been left to the motions of his OWJl
hesitating 'a nd cautious spirit.' no.column ev.er would had l>een &ent in pursuit at aly
,It was only a~r the 1repeated an<l unit,ed aol,icitl!,tions of 11;8:veral of the commanders
ha!} at lengtli euee,eede!} in elevating hie mettle up to the P,oint of 'action, that t!H!
consented to a force beib~ seat in pul'8uit, the battle of Williamsburg. •
When, too, it was sen~ 1t '!\'BB under circumst,a nces that i;nade the horrible confusion
and disorder that reigned 'at Williamsburg ·Re~fectly inevitable.
While Ge)!. MoCtELLAN bad remained behind''at Yorktown, for the purpose, as
be says, of "completing the preparations forthe d~par,ture of (;}en. FRANKLui's and
other troops to West ' Point by water"- a , tiisk which, under the circumstances,
that i~ coneideryng t!iat. Gen. J'l\AN~JN'p Division bad ,rem~ined on shipboard
ever atnc~ it arrived, 'for -the y~~y ,good ri:BSQn tha~ spite 9f Gen, MoG(..ELLA~B
'calls for re'inforcements, ' he cmd1 ,wt find roip.n 1m the Penin~11la to place what
he had, ,-nil that FRANKLT1<'s move'mer\t wu' ;~ mere ~iv;e1'8iOI) and not the Jljain
bu1inese on !\and, might surely .have been entrusted to the General who wae' ti,
borou:and it. AQ_o ut ,nopn of Monday the Prince I>E JoINVILLE and Gen. $PBAG'IJ,E
went down to Yorktown..,to indUCJl Gen. M9CLEtLAN to coq,e up and take charge of
' operations which were gomg eo badly for us. When told the condition of affairs in
·trout; Gen. M~CLELLAN remarked that he bad supposed "those in front cou}d at. tend to that little matter." After some time, howev~r, be started !com Y or\;.town,
reached the vicinity qf WiWamsburg, just at ·the elose of the battle, and for the
first time came face to.face with the aotnal aspect of tha. problem there pres~nted.
Now, if one looks into Gen. MqClellan's ao-called "Report," with a view to disco_yer wb&,t purpose be then a11d there formed in face of the st(lte of facts at Willi~bur~, be will look in vain. l3ut it happens that there ar,e dispatches in existence which <1.-0 pboto~raph G,en. McClellan's mind at this period, and u it is my
aim to pierce to the h1storical tryth ~nderl )'ing the veneer which be has .spread over
these transactions, I will tax the patience of the reader so far u to follow with some
minuteneljll the dissection of one of Gen. McClellan's unpublisl,ed,telegrams.
Whan, t.o ward niglltfall, Gen. McClellan ardved before Williamsbur~. the ooemy
still heia his position there. The troo()S in the front ha~ been fighting within
hearing ?f McClellan during the entire day, but not wit4in his personal supervision,
and be w~ for tbe-1I1ost part, ignorallt of the true' 'state, of affairs.. He thought
,that' tbe enemy bad a securely'.intrJnched position at Will,i,msburg, and had tbt1s
o,posed bis ,further . advance 11,t that time and he delcr111med to loie time befo:r•
Williamsb,.rg, jus{ a& he, had, don• at J'"orkto!D1'., This i• B\lfficiently apparoot from
the follqwi9g tel~gram o·r May 5, wliiGh, no~withstanding its great. hist.orical impo~.~ee, Geu. Mc.Clellan has Mt'seen fi'I, to re-produce:
,
1;
"'

1

B1votrA.O nr hoNT OF Wn~1.uu1Ru-R on,}
'
May 6--10 P. M,

AOer arrang;lng for movement up York river, I wllll urgendyeent for here. I flnd Joe Johnston
ut.:front of me In strong forC6-f)robab!y grro,ter, a good deal, tJu;u,, my own, and Yery olrongly
Jl)trenched, Hancock bas taken 1wo redoubt$, and repulsed ~:arly'sbrlgade bya real ebarge 9f lll<I
bayonet, taking 1 colonel and 100 prisoner•, killing al least two colonels and as many Jieutenanleolonel•, and many privates. HI• oonduel was bri!Tlaul lo the extreme. I do not know our exaei
loea, but fear Hooker bu lost ooMiderably on our left. I i,,a,...Jrom r,rill<>MrB th<u tlt•y iflkna
tU87)utlnq <ifiery ""P to Ri,cl,,m<»µ],. I Bhall rim th• risk, tit at least [wl<Unq tlitm fa cluc/(,1~r•,
"1hlu I r~me tM prigin.al plan. )h ,11Ur•forc• is, "'11d<>ub~dly, ~iMrCU!!y im/.,,-ior to thoJ
rtbol8, wlw auaftqht wtU; b'Ut 'twill do all I can, -Wth tli.6/ore• at my ddBJX>Bal. ·
,
, G. B. M'oOLELLAN.
Major <le.nMal O<mimandlnq.·
:a;on. Et>wnr M. SuN~II, Secrtf.a"1J of War.
This telegraw certainly contaiJls some very extraordin11ry featur~, rema1·kably
illustrative of the peculiar ge11iue of Qeneral McClellan.
, He had bee.n "urgently sent for" as if heavy. firing in his front duriog the day
had not been urgently calling biui forward from , the moment he heard it, without
waiting for a smnmoos ~y special messengers.
.
Hancock bad Jllade a "real charge with the bayonet,'! as 1{ to charge the. enemi
w~th Lue bayonet wao soruethiug aurpl'isin.5 to tht1 lut degree, and not to be loo,k,ejl
for from any portion of his annr.

..

He ,t fears that Hooker lias lost coneiderably,"'becauee he knew, but knew very
little more, that Hooker had been under heavy. fire db ring several hours of the day,
while be was superintending the movement of' Franklin's division' (of .McDowell',
1
oorps) up York river.
Having found bis advance checked at 'Williamsburg, he very gKvely informs•the
Secretary of War that be "111ill 1',m the riak of at le(!.ljt holding tlicm in cl1eck," while
wh&tf Why, being checked himself, he will' run tbe risk of holding the enemy in
check "while he resumes his original plan"-an indefinite expression, which may
refer to either of two plans, tbat of turning Gloucester, -0r tbat of employing regn•
lar siege operations, such as he had employed before Yorktown.•
Hie entire force he represents as" undoubtedly considerably inferior to that of
the rebell!-a second allusion in the same telegram to an opinion which all the cir. oumatiancea, even at the tim•, abowed to be unfounded, th'e enemy having juatl then
precipitately !led from Y-orktown, and having been driven immediately afterward
by "a retJ charge with the bayonet"-ert.ainly no- eigna·of superiority on their
part.
•
·
• '
Be says tha\ the enemy "atill fight well, althou~h the fighting at Williamsbu.r gh,
that very day, was the first that' his army had ser1ously ·encoUI1tered since General
McOlellan had beea in command of it.
'
A'nd, finally, he conoludes th'e telegram by an e,rident allusion to the McDowell
Bllbject of·oomplaint, assuring the Secretary of War that he "will do all he can with
the force at his dispoeal"-language in'dicatiog very great, if not extreme, despondency, fearfully fore·hoding the disasters of a campa1g11 just commenced.
Thia telegram wae written at 10 o'clock on the evening: of the 5th of May,•in
which we gee,1ae just intimated, that General McClellan 's peaks of holding the enemy
in check at Williamsburgh; while, in fact., the enemy, as be then thought, had nqt
only cheeked m, advance, but wall injositiou behind "strong intrenchmenta,'' as he
,alls them, to hold him in check I an he deliberately reports hie purpo~e of resuming hie original plan, the execntion of which wou\d have required time, instead of
· breaking through the enemy's lines.
But what was the true state of the case I This may be seen by the telegram
of the next morning, dated at Williamaburgh, and addressed • to the Secretary of
War.
, ·,
•
f
Hli»Qtr.lRTns AR><T o• POT<>iu.o, L
I

W1LLI.A.K8BURG, Va,

May 6.

!.

I h,ave the pte~aure lo announce' the occ~pat(on o'r this place as the resuti or the h•rd-Couglit .J':OUon ofyosterday. Tbe effect of Elancock'• brlllfanlengagement ye•terday anernoon was \o)ud1 t·b •
left of lbelr line or worka. He was alrongly ~cinforced, and-the enemy al!andotled the eoti,e ))o•IUon durlog lhe night, leaving all hla alok. and wounded i,n our ~nda. The victory I\ ~l>ll\'ele!t'.
•
•
• Am I aulkorized IO follow the example Qf other generats, &11d dlroct the naii:\t•
of battlea lo be placed on lhe colors of regiments? We ba'l<e otbel""batlles to·!lghl liefore reabblil&
Richmond.
.
,
•

G,

n, M'oOLELL.A,N,

M«J<>r (Un,~al Oomman<Ung,

At ten
during the night of tb~ 5th of May, General McClellan formally r9·
por~ that he will hold the eo,emy in chec¼, wheu, in fact, his re"l <;>pinion was \hat
the ene)Dy held him in check; a,qI )le quite dislioctly declarC$ his P,_Urpo~e of reaor,ting to·mea~ll.l'es ,requiring time to ob~aio possession of Williamsburgh, ....:hen at the
moment of writing that dispatch General Bancoc)<, by actin~ in ' the SJ?irit of i,he
Pr.e sident's recommendatiQn to br/lak the enell\Y's linea,,but w1tbout specific iastru9µons from General McClellan, pad turned their position, and hd' actually 11ompMSed what General McClellan despaired of accompli/!hing, excel?t by slow opera•
.ti.ons. On the morning of the 6th of May General McCjelJap, passmg suddenly from
a state of extreme despondeucy, report.a exultingly tba,t the victory of the 5th of
May "is eomplete."
·
•
•
,
.
.,,
ln the state of despondency he exaggerates \he ~trength of the enei,ny, plainly an
,excuse for his delay before Yorktown, and set,& it down as " considerably gl'.eater
t,h.an hi' own;" but says he will do all he can with the force at bis disposal-whe~
t he facts show that the enemy abnn4oned Yor\wwn without waiting for an attack,
and were,.dl'iven out of. Wi\liamsburgb ~y a brilliant aseault made by troops acting
~ oder 11,n in~plration, which General McCle,llan's extreme "Cl!,Ution" could not altpgether restrain.
It is by prec,isely suoh manipulation as this-that is, by constantly puttipg as
•And here It may be observed, that while he was employed beTore Yorktown the enemy conslrucLtd bis line of defence six or ei,,ht m11es In tbe rear, whero General McOiehan propo•ed to
oon:iurnc more time. giving lhP enemy h•hsure.lor the oon8itntet.ion of ao_etber Un""etill further in the
rear, u if he int~n<le~ to 11id lbe enemy i" dt,pu1 in§ ··every OLep to R,cbmond ;'' Ille ,1>nrl/°se or

tile enemy, aceordini IO informt,t.loa received from ' pri&one1:1. ••

••

origiul motives whe.t were reBllV afterthoagli.ts,• Bild by•an adroit use of the tup•
pre88io ,e-ri-t.\it<~ General M~Gleilan eo,l, .,vo,,a to give & false coloring to actions
ilnd e•eute But unfortu.nately for· tJu1 sa.eqes• ol this operatjo», there are too n:111uy
"damne,l spot." that will not "out" for all his 1Hshing.
,
,, 1
•
Of bbe:-e therees oo..,. another that tnust be set fot·th.
•
When General McCleUan, nf~er the battle of Wit liamsbU)'gh took up bis march by
the line of the Yot·k tiver,. and theoce aloug .the rt\..ilrload .to the Chieknbominy, inste&d of atr)kipg a.cross obliquely to the Je.mes, aild, lLiling the.t river , 11,S bis lliH\ of
supplies-a course .rendered possible by ,t be d~tructi9n of tbe Merrimac--we aN!,
according to his Repor'- t<f beUeve tl\at jt was wich extremjl r~luot&nce that he
adopted. this"plau, to whicb he attempts, to make it app.ep,r, that he was reduced by
the iotermeddling of the authorities at ,Washington, ; ,,, i,r,: I v•
,, ,
'
1n respori•e, to.Geiieral!MeClelJau'a ,c<,_netant calb,Jqr,reinfo~emente, it was determined that McDoweU's ,ooi!pe, at Fred~ricksburgb,,sbould move.overland to make a
junction either north or, south of-the l?amulikey, with ti-le right of the Aamy ot:_ the
Potomac, and co operate in the reduction.of Richmond.
•
,
Informed of this determination by a dispatch from -the Secretary of WaJ·, under
date of May 18. O.,neral McClellan goes off in a 6,t of well simulated rage, and dec\11.res that this determination, and the necessity jt imposed of taking the line of the
York river, dest1-qyed all his Jiliws, "This order," he says, " rendered it in\po~siblt
for me to use Lhe James river as a line of op~ratioo~, and J<1ficed me to establish 011r
depote on the P11muokey and to appronoh Richmond from the oorth.
•
•
• The land mov,emeot obliged me to expose my right in order to·seeu:re the j unc-·
tion; ndd' as the order for General MeDowellls IIIJlrch was soop countermnnded, I
• ineurred, great risk, of which the enemy finally ,to9k advantage.and fr11.atrateil tlle
plan of camptiign."
· , ,,
"
,
,
• Now,, is General McClellJ1n so short of memory, or is be purposely guilty of so
. eham_eleas an ineons:istellcy, that he dares to ma~e su<1h an ,S&Sertion as this, wltetl
M i, himself on record, ~m.der ,okvn11 oath, in a se11se directl9 Jiu rroer4~ i
In his testimqny before the Committee on the Conduct 0£ the Wai~ General Mc- •
Clellan in reply to the specific questions-,-" Coulq. not tbe advance OJ), Richmond
from Williamsbnrgh h&~e been made with bett11r pro-peet of ~ucof.s~ hy t!,e J,ones
river tl,an by the rou./e purmcd, and what were the reasons for taking the route l'dopted !"-stated as follows:

I

"J.d.o 001 think lhal the navy at lhal time was in a ooodlL!on to make the Une or the Jarpee
, river ,1_>erfectly oecu~re for our supplies. The Iii•• of'th• Pamunkty offetul, orearor ad;oanrau"' i,n
thtar,.-pect. Th• au-w<11 in a bttte,• polriU~n to •ff•ct aj,uwtion tofll. nnv troop~ t/1,(rt 11,igM
-.,,,.,,,,, from _,,,,M, (!ton on th.ti Freder·icJ<;,/burv"- lin,. I rt1Mmbor tlt<tt tht, i lea of mm,inp on
"IM .Tames rwer@a8 1,ori1»<$!,y diJIC<fb.•e# at th.tit t.imt. ]Jut t/u CQIVhta!on. '!Ca8 arrivt!l ta thai,
tmd•r M.t> Circv,~tancu then e'f;i•iinq, tl,t ru'UM act1'ally follow64 ,ca; U,t,bt8t."

I leave to other!! tpe task of harmonizing tbesl! "poin~ of mighty opposites,"
and of determinlng which is original motive '!lnd which afterthought, If they cannot be harmonized, I leave the readec to stamp with its fiUing oha1·acteriza~ion.
thjs assertion of G-eneral MoOlell&o's.
'
'
•· "Bnt the truth of history'require• me to go further, and to point out that it·was not
,.t Williamsburgh but ai Ropers church, where the •army was, ten days pr~iously;
that it was necessary to decide '\Vh-etber be would there cross the Chickahom,ny
(nndefeoded) and nppi-oach the J11m'es :river, fthen open t'o us by the d estr,rot,ion of
the Mf'?"rhnar,) o~ ~ontioue on the Williabisb'urgh ~oad townr<;l 1.,tichtnond. The decision was ruade tben and there, and the de'oision was to n1ove by the Y'ot·k and
Pa,:ounkey. So that so f,.r from its being tr11,o, as claimed by Genernl :tfo<:::l«llunthat the dispatch of the Secretary of W ar "or/Jering" him to coilnect by land· with
McDowell, obliged him to r~oounce a route by which, ns he would now lea.d us to
beUeve, he could have ta.ken RichQ1ood, the truth is that the choice of ·rout.e was
voluntllrily made' by General McCle1fan te,t days before thi/J order h.e qwte• w1u given;
and yet Ile has io his report the astounding RSSt'lranee to complain ,or the o~il>r in
que~tioo as subj~eting b,m
"great riske," of 'wh.ich the enemy ljotilly "took a<;i'
'T&nt,1ge" and "fruatrated •· the plan· of Mrnpl!ign I"
··
·
,. ' What the enemv took advantage of-and whaVhe woh](l' htve lleen a fliol b.ad be, _.
not takeu advtlntuge of-was Gen. McClellan's own ill-judgtld scheme.of operation•,
by w bich he gave the Rebels an interior p o~ition between himself and the foree
covering W nsbington. fost as Gen. 1',feDowell was about to start from,Predericksburg, witl). a reinforcement of forty thousand men, came the news of Jackson's r&id
up tne Shen11odoah Valle.y, apd Gen. McPoweU was ordet·ed by tl,te Presid~nt to
send first one division, then anoth«r, and then his whole force, to follow Jackson& 1·equest whieh is evident frow G.:n. McDowell's.dispatch~s, h~ complied with wit,b.

l
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23
extreme r~iuct&~ce, !is it, fo\. t~e time ·being, 'd iverted him from his proposed march
to j•>iu McClellan, which lie had extl'emely at heart.
·
Thus earlv was the ord~r de'taining McDo,vell's corps to cover Wasllin~ton folly
justified I This, 'as ,veil as'all tfte circumstances of the case, are fully set forth in a
djspalch from the Pre&ident, qnder date of M!ly 215, in which, after giving the details
of Ja/:keon1s movement and the dispositions tliat had been made in C!)nsequence, he
con cl odes as follows:
'
"Tf ;JfcD(JIJ)tll'8f()rc,;
..,,. n.ow bt-y01tdourr,ach, ""' .s lundd be'utut·ly htlplus. .Jpprthtnef.Q'IO
of aomtthinu llu thia, and no 'UfWnUitl{Jl!t88 to 8tl8tain you, ),/cs olwav• bttn "'11 reason
' for toithholdin(I MoD<>tD8ll'a forcefro,n 11011. Pitas• midw/ltan@tJda, a-n.ddoth6 b68tyou ec,n
wi.lh th6 fore,; 110.. have.''
·, · 1,
,
•

I submit if this language does not display, on the part of the President, a tenrper
worL':Y the name of sublime, especially
w~ ,p9nsider it was addressed to
the man who, of all others, had most tried his .patience-the man whose conduct, on
nam bet·le"" ocl:aeions, had deserved his severest di$pleasure---t,he,ma o to' whom th~
President Lad conceded uo1imited means 1for preparing one of the most powerful,
armies ever raised in aoy country-the man wbo, after all, evaded, by an attempted ,
artifice, the orders of his constitutional chief, thereby exposing the capital-of the
nation to be sacked by the .enemy, and exposing also hie really grand artny to defeat
and dange" of immioeut destructien r
·:
"
•rhe couoWrlnitnding of the ordee given ·to McDowell; gave McClellan ,w hat was
far ,more valuable to him than the f\'Ctuai reinforcements which that General would
have brought-to w<it, IJn 1exouee, 01· the semblance of .an exiluee for. further delays.'
For a long time he and his friend, were a61e to eaddle on that detention aU the
blame of hie failures; but this shallow trick has ceased to ,be poseible since the
publication . of ,bile documenra in the C&5"; and I may add that it has ceased to be
po,sible sin.c e,tne publication of Gen. McClellan's own l·e1)()rt.
Gen. M:eClellan states that "tbe information that McDow:eU'e corps would march
from Fredricltsburg.b on the following 1•Monday, (the 26th,) and that he would be
under my command, ws.clieering
and ·I now felt tl,al,we 11Jould on Iii& arrival
l,e 1;11.fficiently stron:g to werpot06r th.e ·t ar9e army confronting u11." Thie is1aimulated
joy aud bad no being,iir the •bosom of, Gen. McClellan at the tinie. Th<1 fact is Gen.
.McClellan- did not wihh Geo. McDowell to join him by an overland mareli ;1h e
wished him to eome by water on his rear, and stated •aJ; ·the ,time that .he 'IJJOuU
ratlier Mt have liim at all tha,, ltave !tin, come overland I This fa.ct is al-Jundantly
pt·oven by numeroas di~patches; published and ·unpublished. T,bus, nnder dat.e o(
May 21, he writes: "I fear there is' little hope McDowell cab 'j'oin me oYerland fa•
time for the coming battle." (One would suppose from this that lie was going to
fight a battle in ten minutes.) But if I.le did oot think McDowell would be able to
join him "in time" bv an overhnd march of fifty tnilM, (an easy three or four
dnye' march,) how co ... i be expect h,m to join him in time by th.e water route,
when, according to his e,rper'ien()e, the transit could not have been accomplished
ahol't of a fortnight! This is iterated and reiterated day aft.er day, and finally, in
a dispatch, under date·of June 14, he says, with sLill greater emphasis:

...,ta,,

"H ought to be distinctly understood tb•t Mc:Oo'll·ell and bis troops are completely under my
eoutrol, 1- r&:eiv•d "IAltegrapb from him requestln1< that McCall's DJvl•lon might be pl~cod sol
u to jvin him lm,ine<iialely on hia airiYal. Thal request doe• nQ; pt,·athe u,1, J>roper epiril.Wh,tover troops come to me must be so rlispoe,,d of a. IO do the rnosl eo~. I d 1not feel f,eltbat,
, In ouch circumstances as lbose lo wblcb l &ll:\ n,ow pluced, Gen. McDowell shoo Id wish the
general interest to beoacrlftced for . the -purpo&e of increasing bis command. I/Ican,.otfuU11_
co,itrol ail hi8 ,#roopa, I want non6-<!/ Uum, b,<$ <Dould pref,.. ,lo ttuM
ba Uu wl,th, wW I
Moe, a,,ll W oth•N be r68µn8U>u /or IJ,o r#!'lt/1,"

Now, •peaking of what does and what does not" breathe tbe proper spirit," I
would like to ask whether this astounding declaration of Geo. M"cCletlan "hreath1!s"
exactly t'he "proper spirit f" ·According to bis own repeated deelarations, he W'll8
in a position in which rein,or~emeuts were absolutely es!ential, and yet "8 prefer,
not to have them at all, unle.,s l,e can have tliem. by a route, cmning by wllich tlley
vwtild have ..eguired thrice the lct1.g tli of time, and by wllich they 10011ld alM have been
put out of tlle possibility <if ojferfa!J any protect/mi to tl,e threatened Oapital of th~
nation.. 'l'he 'ooly advantage his plan presented is that i t would have enabled him,
t,o break up M<lDowell'e aivieioos as they arrived, and assign them to the 'commands
of Ilia own favorites, ana iid him of the man, whom he had come to r~gard with the
.green eye of jealousy. , I submit to the cat1did reader to determine whether Gen.
1,lcClellan is in a situation .to throw hipisclf back on hie injured ionoceuce, and
~laim for himself and bis conduct such pure aod elevated and unselfish and patriotic
motive11, ior whetbei; ,all these claims are not th~ m9st, bollo"l 110d unmitigated
i?etenoa.
l ., ,, ,1•
•
·r
tjil 1i

0£ 11-v-eote, on the , Qh,iokahominy, ao damning ·to McClellan, so hu.mi,li11tiog to
the whole country, there i, neithet the PpMe nor thi patience here to •penk.•Two deci&i ve bat~lee were fooglit 011 the Obickabomi~-.F&ir Oak! a11d G&Jues'
?iill. They were 11o t batt lee 9~ ¥ cOJellan's eeelrin~they were brought on by the
rebels, and we are thus preaenbfd ,with ~he odd epeetaclti of a (leneral ~11~kin1:s a
special theatre of war for the purpose of making not only an offensive, but a "rapid"
and "brilliant" movement., compelled each time be met the eQemy to fight on the
tkfon8ive. We have the fu~ther ep1-ctncl~ of a man '!{!lo was oooetaotly clamoring
for reiuforcem~ot.s,fa.zhtit~ lti8 t11JO cliief battle8, thd Jir~t wltli' 0110-half, tlie 8e<;,ond
uith ltu tho.. OM-tMrd /111 /<>'rce f
To the last we find him persisting in the demand for more troope-to the Jut
we find )lim the man who was ready to
•

'

I

"Drllll< UJ) EaUe, eal a croeodl.16,"

doing n,ltlii.t1!7 with what he bad. "If at this ioataot," aaya he, ,the day after the
battle of Garnes' Mill, "I could dispose of ~n tkomand freab men, I could gain the
victory to-morrow "-a 81atemeo~ lo which we migh~ reply that, had he not allowed

Porter's oo~pe ,t.o be alau~htered tbe clay before, he would have had tbe ten thou,aud
he there loet. '.But it 1s very remarkable that., with au enemy '' two hundred
thousand" etrong, and behind "strong entrenchmeote," he should have deemed
himeelf capRble of"gaining the Tiotory" with a feeble reioforcemeo\ o( ten thousand
men, wb1ol1 would bave b e~o uo more than be baJ during •II the lime he did not
"gain a viet.ory." In fact, bis viet.oriea on paper and ill hypothesia, are part of the
wonderful phenomeua of Geo. McClellan's character.
Having lost his blU!e, aod the enemy being planted acroe. bis communioatiooe, it
onl:,' remained for Gen. MoClellao to b~at a retreat to the James Riv'er. This act.
he dignified at the time by the eupbeoism of "chaniie of base ' 1-a phraee which
bu aince then acquired a ludicrous meaning it will Jong to 1088.
Tlie retreat to the James, considering the bulk of the enemy wae on the left bank
of the Cbickabominy and a long mal'eh off, w1111 not difficult. But, notwithat.andiog
thie fact, and that the troopa were put in the 'most obviooa pll'litions, and that in
no oase waa Gen. McClellan present at any of the engagements of the '' seven daye'
fight.," this movement ,bas been claimed as a master-pieae ~£ atrategy-compllra•
ble, eay h.ia admirers, only to Moreau'a retl'eat through the Blaek Forest. And I
date say that t.he credit in the one case is about as just as in the other; for Napnleon
proolaime that Mor.eao's retreat was "t.he ~reateet blunder he ever committed.'',, Al the Di rectory," adds he, "could not ~•ve Moreau credit for a victory, tliey did
for o rttreat, tcliich tluy ca1ued to be t zlolled in the hif1MU terou; bot., iu~l~ad of
•edit, Moreau merited the greatest censure and diegrace for it." I leave the
parallel t-o the reader's own app1·ebeo•ion.
Io all tho> battles d ori1,g i.lue retrograde movement., we have the ume utter want
of head-Geo, McClellan in each ca•e l,eing absent getting a fr~h position to fall
back upou. Thie ia the first tiwe that we have iloowo that it is the first ond highest
duty of a Commanding General to reconnoitre positions for a retreat. "The Corpe
CoDl,D:laod~re,'' says Geo. Ileiolzlemaq, i!1 hia t.estimooy bele1e \he Committ~e 01' the
Conduct of the War, '1.fough, their troops according to their own idea,. We helped
eaoh other. If anybody uked for reioforoomeuts, I sent them! if r wanteJ reioforce01ente, I relit to other$. H e (McClellan] WM the most extraordinary man I
ever saw. I do not ,e, lt.010 any man c01,ld leave 40 umch IQ c,lh(r•, a114, b, 10 crm.fiden.t
tl&at ••)(lrytl,iotg 'lliould g<>'j118l rig/it," Even at the Jut of the ije1•ice of battles, whe11
a defe..t would bav1, 11,rowo b is Rr my into the Jilmes Rivllr, at Malvern, we tind
him, with the exception or a brief p eriod preui<>-..a to and at the t 11d of the fig ht,
a way "on board a gunboat," anq tbis, notwi~hstanding the 11dJ)litted fact that t.ba
innate valor of our troope gave the _,nemy so deoi4ed ,. repulse that, if vigorously
followed up, they might even then have beeo followed up 101.o Richmond.
So ends the story of the.strange, eventful campaign on the l'enineola-a campaign
,:,rhiob, thou~b ill-plaorred, was worse ex~cuttd, and iu wbith the uttel' iooap&eity
tJt the Comruaoding General to lalie advantag e of even such opporlooiti86 as fortune
threw in his way, was most signally demooetrated. Gen. McClellan did not brillg
back with him sueh an army u he bad taken 'away. He brought back an a1'my
demoralized, worn down by U!elesa toll, reduced by sickoees, almMt unmatched in
th_e annals of war. Be found the rebel cause at the lowest ebb, and the rebel army
• A full crlllclml of lbe whole or McO!ellan' o m\11tary conduct on lbe pe'lllosula will be found
Ill lbe 1erle1 or ar1lcle1 lo lbe N. Y.,-imee, review 01 McOlellan•a Report, b7 lbe preaeoL wrii.e.,

..
demort.lize'd arid ai~lri!~d. H e !ere one 'in the flood,tide ol' suceess1 lbe morale bT
the oll,Pr reolori:d by the pre!tige'l>f gre~t viCWl'ic:3.

HOW POP E GOT OUT OF HIS "SCRAPE."
If the.army had sual,o.ioed ilself nobly thro11~h o11t the sad campaiit\l nn, the Peniosuln, it cannot, l>e d eoied ~hat so much fruille.• toil nod so mndn di~ast.>r had
impaired i~ moral/. ·while the IOl'e~ io battle and the epidemic~ of the region baa
greatly thinned its r11nk.s. It therefore became a serious question when the army
arrived at Rarrison1a Landing whether it should be allowed to remain or be brought
away.• At fint there seems t,o have been no other int.aotion than to reioforce liLlClel)an and let him try it once again. He had promised if furnished with twenty thon•
aand men to assume the ofl'eneive and attempt fresh advance towards Richmond.
Accordiogly Shield's division wae sent him and other troops were about to b e forward•
ed when he put up his r ~que~t to 60,000 men, and finally demanded reioforcementa
"rather much over th1m under 100,000 strong." It was utterly impoaaibl~ to furnish
this number, and this reason, joined to the fact that a m&jority of the highest officers
of the a,rmy of the Potomac connsele(l a withdrawal, and that a movement to effect
a junction with the forces in front of Washington, now under Gener11I f ope, Wjl_B
essential to cover the Capital against the attack which the rebels wei'e absolutely
cert&in to make, and for which they were at this very lime actually prepBTing, determined the Administration to recall the army from th'I Peninsula. ..
'l'be ord er for the withdrawal of th'e army from the l'enins11la wa~ given h;i,' ~neral l(allec~ 011 the Sd of August: Tbe point to which it waa ordered, waa Aquia
Creek, for tlie purpose of making a junction wi~h the forces nnde,r P o_pe, on t he
:Riippahannock. It is hardly neceeaa1·y to say that an.er tbls course wae determined
upon the utmost possible promptitude in execution of the design ,vas absolut.ely
necessary, for there could be l!O doubt that the purpo9e of the rebels looking toWGrd a n1ov111;11eot on Washington would receive the most powerful stimulus by the
knowledge ofibe withdrawal of the army from tile Peninsula.
But ~t.ead of tbi,, we fiod General McClellan sitting down to expostulation, an~
after he had eJlhan,ted this, we see him throwing every practical ob$tacle in the
way of getting the army back. Re urges "t/,e krri/Jly depreBBing effect 011 1k Nortl
and the strong probability that it wonld induce foreign powers to reco~nize our adversaries," whereas the fact ie, there was hardly an intelligent man m the North
who was not looking with the most intense anxiety to the removal of the army to
a position where it could be interposed between the enemy and the menaeed Capital of the n.&tion. He promiaee, however, if' hia oounael does not prevail, to "obey
the order with a sad heart."
This "sadneea" of hia heart aeems to have ao enfeebled his hand, that tboogh he
was orderl!d to commence the removal of the army on the 8d of :Auguat, day aft.er
day paaaed before anythin.g was done toward it. "Tt i8 believed," writes Oenernl
Halleck to him under dat,i of the 6th,•" that it [the removall can be done now
without aerioue danget, Tl1i1 may dot be 10 Blwttld there be any ~lay."
•
Finally, on the 10th, he received dlepatchea which should have stirred the most
1luggieh nature to activity: "They art fighting-General Pope t<>-<iay-there moat be
no further delay in your movements; that 11!hipl1 /,a, alYeady ocourHd ,oaa ,me~ectetl
a11d tni'3t be 11Jliif1U1t<>rily ezplai,u,d.'' Tais only gives McClellan an opportuiuty to
ahow the enormoua "inherent difficnltiea of the movement "-difficulties which were
pointed out to him before he etarted to take the army to the Peninsula, but 'INlich 1w
IM,. madd liglu o/-tiod h4! enda by adding: "It is not poeslble for aqy one to place
Um army where y1>u with it in leu t/1411; a month; if Washingl-0n is iu daJJger now
thi, arn,11 can ,o,rcely arrive in time to ,ave it I" What a ch e~ring pe11!0n Geueral
111:Clellan i8 I
Without following th~ tranaactiona through all their maddening details, auffioe
it ta aay that it waa the 20'-h of the month-uventeeA. day, after the order for withdrawal was g~nn-before the army wae ready to embark at Yorktown, Fortrea11

a

• There IA coooecfed w1'b tbla J)Orlloo of MeClellao•a car- one e11rlo11e piece ot lusLOry
aertte a pa.wog ootlee heNI, :Reade,. of lhe Repon -wlll nOl bne lllllod 10 line no~ an emaordlnary leller add,.,_a l,y General McClellan to 1be l'reeldent, ttgin llanlJoo'a Bar, under dale
of JUiy 7, giYlnc hi• ""1ow1" on tho polltteal1a11natlo". Thlt document opeu with 1h11 ,1a~
meol that tbe "rtb.Zlio,. haa
th•
a 'll4r "-• dh1covety 1"b.lch, perhaps,
e,g,lalna llae peace pr101lplu on wblcb General Mef'lellan bad been optratln«, but wblob IL le
a mi,rortune be did nol make al an earlier dale. 'lnMII proeeedl to lnd.lcale a polilloo-QlllllarJ
programme or lht morAI auuloo 11<1mp, 1Le.llng that "a dfflanllon 'o f radlw rt•w.,_ee,eelalq

w,..acu,,
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Monroe and J'i"ewport'e News. And with tbis I leave· it, to find it turmng \!p
again at Alexandria, where I shall ' ha,ve to review a series of events, tbe most ex•
traordiuary, perhaps, in General McClellan's extraordinary career.
The whole rebel army was now rapidly marching northward to overwhelm Pepe
and precipitate itself on Washington. H Gen. McClellan's own estimate of the rebel
force, at 200.000, was correct, Pope had upon him a force six times his strength,
and, as it wllS, he certainly had upon him a force three or fowr times his strength.
,Hie instruet,ons were to "stand fast" on the Rapnahannock- to "fight Ji ke the
devil and contest every incb of ground." In this task.. be was cheered by tile
annoui'lcement that from AlexandriA h~ would speedily redeive heavy reio:rorcemen ts, am(\ni which was the corps of Frnnklin, which\he d'tisigoed fo move to
Gain esville, a pos1t1on which covered Manassas
Junction, and r atcheq the gaps in
the Piedmont Ridge.
·1
With the v~ew of ~lving
to this P,Ul'!Jl'Se, Gen. Halleck, On the morning of
the 27th of August, telegraphed to''Mc'cleflan, wh<i'liad arrived in Alexandria the
.1a! before, and: through wbo,:o all reinforcements to Pope m:iist p'ass, that "Frnnk,110 s' corp,s shoild marcJi: in the direction of Manassas as soon as po3sible." Had
this order beeu <ibeyed, Jac\s9n's force,, defeated and driven by Pope OU the 2'1th,
would have been met- near Ceotre'ville the ,next1afternoon and crush ed.
Now I ask of the reader to bring all the attention and patience he can co11mand,
while I show wiLh what/e,rtility of device, and what pl·odigality of -ingenuity,
Gen. McCldlan contrivea so to arrange things that Pope-should no; get 'a ,iian of
these reinfo1·cements; but should be left with his feeble force of less than forty
thousand mer'! to a death-grapple with the evemy that bad lately defeated McClelJan'a once sp1endid army of one hundred and fifty thousand men: in other w6rds,
should be left. to-I use Gen. McClellan's own choice phra1etogy-" get oz,t of h~
sprape." And f shall show that w completely suece'~ful was 'he tMt not a si,igl•
tnan ever reached Pope after Mc(Jlellan arrived at Alexandria.
In this expose l shall take un events in their chronological order, beginning wi~h
.the date of ~he first dispatch t6 McClellan with reference to the forwarding of reinforcement.a. I shall show what was the state of facts in f1;imt1 what were the nehow be carried
ce~ities of tho occasion, what ?r~ers Gen. McC111llan reeeived1 and
them out. Let me add th1\t l sh;all not draw from the tesUnfony of Gen. Pope, nor
from th e overwhelming array of facts developeq by the Committed on tlie Cotlduc&
_of the War. I sba.11 coofiioe myself 'to the ,s,ia;ipie settiog forth of toe tert of the
_eeries of telegrams that passed botweeu head'q uarters and Gen. McCleJl<ln, though
I Bhflll be forced to (}raw from many dispatches which Gen. McClellan; for reasoll3
' bes~ 'D0\\1r,i ~9, hi1R~f/!~11J112, n<,>t seel).,,fit, to reproduce in bis 80·Cl\lled "Report.."
: Tl1e 27111 ef,-4,wu,/,.-,,$.;,tO ~ ' ¥,-, Gen. ,Halleck telegraphs McCl?ll!ln:
"Franklin• Corps «b0n1d ,nnrch in \hat direction [Mana~a&J aa soon ao poulble."
,
,
,
At 10 20 (ien, Mc~lellan replies: L , ;
:
\
1
"I have sent ordero to· FraRk.lin to prepa,-, t i) march, al!d #o f'fpa,r lwi•rl+,lexaudrla] "'
J>•rarm, t<> i1iform m;1 a, to hiJJ m,anf of lrifMPortatio>o."
,,
1
At Doon Gell. Halleck reiterates, with emphasis, hie order to FrBllklin to
march.
.
i•.1..1•
"F,anklin'e corps should move '/;111 by forced marcbee, tarrying lbree Jr rour doys provision."

eff~et

\

ate.

·

·

,

• To this Gen. McClellan replies at 1 111 P. M.;
'

1

·

•

1,

Franklin's ar.,tJllfrY _have no horses, except for four guns;'" and adds:, ' 1 I do not ,u that to,
wg;\ ti. hand to form a co,.,,,cti<m toilh Po-p,, flhoH ,o:acl porition ... do _,

1aa1,o fore•
''knot.olJ

Is

•n

·

ii Dot ve1·y'stranlle that in order tba:t FrankliO'ahould maroh with 'l;is corps, Ge~.
I

McClellt<n ~bclu1d'begin by calling him 11·way from it! If Franklin's'artillery lacked
horses,' why did be not take horses which were in ..bnndatieejn Aleundri,a I Th'at
this wae so, I shall P.resently establish conclusively; and I shall also show that
neitl= .Afc'Olellan, n or Fra1ikli1{, ever ·applied f"r tran,<portdtior,, lo tM Quarler,,ta>
,ler'i lJep(frtmeni, tftich u•u ready in#~ntl,'1 to furni3h it. '
•.,,
upon Slavery, toill r<vpidl,y ctiainu{/MU our pr..wi armiu.•• Now, wbal t•· nolable In Ible
p•per ls, tbal'il 1DIU 'torUt,..,. W.aa1'mutou b•for• h.t, ll;flfor hu Ptl)41'fUl<tr e4,apatgn, ond t01U
• wiM«l•d t<> b• io-uect ;,,. Rtcam6114, He faneio<i'lte would lbere,bo in a posllfon lo dictate termp
<and lndloaie the public polley.. ,Nol ftnding bl• e:rpeeied opportuntly to ftre oJ! lhe •hol );le had
prepared, be took the heal occasion be could,ftrul; and "" J>Ulting op• "tag" al 1be ~egiontoe
1md the end, he brought ll 001 al Harrf~on'a Landing. h. IBell'able lmpudeuce, the haggard
<end unUmely ' look 11 ;ween , ' and the lnherenl abourdlly , or Aho prppoaltioo to deal lcnleol!J
wUh tbooe.a$ whoae bahdB Ile badj~ol ewlered dlu,trqq deteal, JI'& •~lllcle'!Ll1 accow,led for~
iib.e clrcuma,anoe. deiailed..1
·•
,
u .... ., L.... ,,
j.
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The 28th of .Angust.-On the morning of the 28th, Halleck telegraphs directly to
Franklin :
'
'' Oo parting with Goo. McOlellan. about 2 o'clock tbi• morning, It was nnderstood that you

were lo move wllh. your corps to-day toward Man•osas Junc1ion, to drl\'e the enemy from the
ra,!lroad. I 1,ave just le~rned that the general bll!l not relurne<l to Alexandria. lfyoo. have DOI
received his order, a.ct ,On. t!ll(,a."
,
•
1
To this, at 1 P. :.'it, MeClellan, not Franklin, replies :c•
"Your d~1•at-0b to Franklin recqivecj. 1 h•i-e qeen doing all l\()i'alblo to b1trr y ar tll\ery aoll '
c&valry. The mo1wiu1 •/l'll Fr anldin eau be starleil, with a r ••""nable ~roo1111t o( ~r1it1, ry, h• shall
go
•
* • ·. * • • • • . Piea,e •ee Barnard, aod be ,ure 11,e w,,rko l<>w11r4, toe Chain
Bridge a re perfectly oecure. I look upon 11,oso works, F.Ll,,., Alien a nd :ll.arcy, a• of 1ba flr8\
nnportanoe ,,
·
\

At 8 80 P . M., Halleck impatiently telegl'llJ?hs McClellan :
•
"Not a m<>tri.6nt .must b• wst j~' pursning as large a rocce ao pooalble to<Yard ManaMee, 10 a1
Woommunlc,,.te <Yitb PoW-bef<11·0 tM"otiemy (f rdliifor,wl,,"
To U1is McOlellan repli'el at 4 40 P. M.: 1
"0on Frnnklin i, .,,;,u,, mo l,ero . I will Imo!" ln a few minute• ll)e coodillon or artillery and
ca'valry. We au oo, y~t'ln a C011dilion to mo-v~IHt1/ 11• by t<J-ttwrrow moming."
,
At jl 40 P. M., Halleck still more i'mpel'atih,ly telegrnpbs :
" There mual be no further delay In moving Franklin'• corps toward Manassas; ·t hoy mmt go/Jomor-r011J m,ON1,in(I, rtady or not-rtady. If we delay too long 10 gel ready, 1bere will be no ne•
c•••lly lo go al all for Pop• w/.U oUMr b• defw.tul or mc/.ol'tot'8'Witkout our cwt. If there I• a

~~1:,.~(

wagons, th~ men musL carry provhtons wHh t.bcw. tlll the wagons eau come to Uleir

·~o which Gen. ~IcCl~llan replies at JO P . M. :
'
'· Your dispatch received. , .Franklin'• corp• bas been ordered to march al 6 o'clock lo-morrow

morulug. Sutunl'r has al.>oul> 14,000 lnfautry, without cavalry or o.rtillery, here."

These dispatcb;s~ive the history of the 28th of Augu~t. dot ,;me of the8e i,
publul,ed by Gen.. McOlclla•• i,i his R eport. 'lbcy sholf t,be l'~iterat ~d orders Geo.

McClellan received to send reinf9roem:euts w Pope, m,id t ~e im91ioence,of the crisis
that was upon t,hat Qeneral. '4'hey show on the part of McCleUan tJ1e sbnllow sub- .
ter(uges hl!teDlployed to avoid obeyi1>g these' orders. Io this whole series. of excuaes, t!wre is but one that presents ~ven the ,.iltoui of sebstantiallity-namely tbe supposad lack of transportation; bu_t the utter baselessness of this pretepce is made
manifest by a dispntcb of Gen. Halleck a day or two afterward, in; ":hich he e~ys:
" I learned last 01gl1t (29t!1) that the Quarlermastera Ds1partmeot woµld bave given
t.im (Franklin) plenty of tran~portatioµ ifche had applied for it any tiine $i11ce hi•

arrival at .Aleza,idria." •

,•

111

'l.'lie 29th of Augwj.- At Jengtb,, two whole pays after the iµ,perative,order was
given to Gen. MoClellao,to have Franklin '' move out by forc~d marohes," be is sble,
to say, "Franklin's corps .is in.motion.'' To be sure, Geo. McCleJlan confesses that
bis repeated promises throughout the the two previous days to send Franklin forward were:alLsbe.ni, for he fl&YS; " I. sh,Q\!ld n<>t have moved ~m but for your pre,wiog ordel'8 of last night." Still be is, at lengtl). llnd~r way, and tl;iere is yet a possibility that he will reach Pope in time. Vain hope I Ile halts Fraokli)l. at Anandale and coolly teleirapbs to Halleck :
;
,
"Do you ioiak t}I,(, mcn,oment of Fra,~11•'• ccrp8 lo con.tin,ia I He la without rll$erve ammunl- ·
lion and wlthoul lraru,porl,lltlon."
, •
Gen. Halleck must be a very mild mannerea ma n, for he simply replieR :
" I

<Dl.lnt Ji'r(Ml,k/f1'' Bcarpt lo m,,nJtfnr tn,>,u ~h t-0 ftnjl, -0ut wmtt,.in(I 111><,ut th.~ tntmy. Perhaps

be may g~L such inrormation at, An~ndale a.s to prevent. his goiQ.i further; otht;r wise, he will

push on toward ~'airfax. Try lo get wmethlng from dlr~cl\Oll of Man•..••• •ILhor by telegrams
or tbrougb Fran KIin's scouts. Our people m ·" •t m,l)r)t mo~• <1cU~tly, a,,4,jlnd oul whtr• th.t ~i,e• llflfi.8, I am ti red or guea&cs.11 1
,
,, •
1

,.n

1

.•

Giln. McClellan had now exhausted
the reaourccs of a diabolical ingenuity in
Qrder to keep Po~e froif,' receiving reiuforcements. He bad by this rnea6s i:;aioed
two days nod a half; that is, fro~ 1Q A, :M. of'tlle 27th until 3 J>. M,, of the 29th.
Ile 'J."fl.e'/4 that Pope had by this tiu1e the whole ,-.,l>d ut·,uy u.,,rn biui. II~ knew
that a gryt battle wall. LLllt very moroiog a,,d,llfL~rut>on goiog uo, for the roar of
the a1·tiller_y cnme ~o bis ears at Alexandria, whe re he held thirty thousand Joyal
A:mericans m the leash, while their brcitbers in arms were beiog oierwhelmed. It
was a c,;,;s with M.tClellan, nod be mus~ either let the t1•oops go forward to Pope
or <jevi~e l\ oew eye~ern1 bf tactics:• Ile could n6 longer pr«tend that he did not
know where Pope ~as-he could n<J- longer pr41tl!nd that he did no~ know how far
Geo. Halleck. wished l~t·,mklin to advance. He was brought t;o the wall by Gen.
lfalleck'$ empbatie' order. "Our paopk nuut ft1td,o~d. wltere tlti .e11~/11y is!" ,
• Geo. McC{e)lan wss equal to the emergency: Re'<lrops the oohespondence wit h,
Halleck, and coolly indites to' tbe P resident of the Ouited States the followiµg .d ie•l

'

,I

•
patch, the moi!t e:i:trliordinary ever penned by any man wearing a soldier's uniform.
I pause for a moment to uk the reader to take in a full realizing aen74 of the
import of the following amazing words:
,
'' Tbe laat news I received Crom the direction of Man1184118 .,,.. froft\ 11ragglers, to the effeet
lllat the enemy were evaco.a&lng Oen1erv1Ue and retiring towards Thoroogb(are G'ap. Thi• 1• br

no meRn& reliable. I am clear that one or two coureea ehould be adopted. ~irst--To c/>ncenlrate all our available forces 10 open romrnunlcallon with Pope. Seco,o<.l-To ~e• RIYP6 to oti

•'f' q//li1,4crapo, au<j. at ooce lo

use all means to mate the Capllal perreolly ••'•· No mldd\a
cour,e wJII oow anewer.. Tell me what you wish me IO do and I w)II do all In my power IO ac,.
<iqmollfh ti. .I wish 10 11:now what my orden and authority are. I ask for nothing, bot will obey
""•te•er ordera yoo rl•e. I only a,t a prompt decltloo, tba! I may al oace gl,e the nec.i1Ur7
onlen. It will not do to delay longer.•

Expre98ive silence is th,e only po11Siele comment on this, 1111tou,nding propoeition,
fo:r the. profound horr9r Md cop tempt such .words inspire take a way all po'jVer oJ
oool dieeection. It is eaid that w<hen Mr, Liocoln read tl,ia di~patch he fell back in
hia chair in a hair faioting fit.and even at thia distance of time it la hardly p081ible
to read it wit9out a aioking oft.be heart.
General McOlellao in the above prod0&ition auggeats two courae.s. I need not
aay that they are substantially one an the aame. He huto that Lee'$ junclio•• with
Jackt0tt1M~ "l/11' cor\ain7if~~z John Porter. had attended to that. . In either case,
therefore, Pope·w'aa p'e rfectly ·~erto.in to be )ef~ to Ii get out of l1i~ scrape."
But what was the "acrape" out of which Pope waa to get f Into what horrible
indiscretion-ao unwarranted that to leave him to •·get out" of it was only juet
punishment on him-bad he rushed f Will it be belie r ed that he got into "the ecrape"
at the urgent instance of General McClellan, who begfed Pope to make a diven11on
in hi's favor f Will it be believed that, with the loya alacrity of a true soldier, he
bnd, in obedience to this request, thrown himself down on the Rdpidan to oompel
the enemy to loose ~is hold oo the Army of the Potomae-tbat he received the
whole weight ef the rebel force precipitated upon him-that with masterly generalship he kept back that force for seventeen daya, figMiog in that time eeveral large
battles, io which, repeatedly auccessful, be gave the rebels their first taste of true
punishmeu~tbat by this means be succeeded in gaining time sufficient l>r General
MoClcllan to bring back hi9 army to the defence of the Capital f Yet such are the
fMt:a which history records. Now we understand. This was the "scrape" Pope •

'l'he 301h of A.ugu,!l.-I have exbaueted the main action io this strange drama,
but there remains a n episode that should take ita place in this recital. So far as tba
keeping back of reinforcementa goee, Gene1-al McClellan had done his bes, that Pope
1bould oot "get out of bis B()rape." But there remains a touch beyond this. Pope'•
a mmuriition, rations and forage wert now exb&usted, aod ho eent to Wash ington 1.41
procure eupplie.!l. General McClellan was to fill. the orders. You shall now see how
he did it.
To the requeet forw ammmunition, General ?ifoClellan telegraph• at 1; IO p. m.:
"[ know nothing of t/14 calibre of Po~•• artillery." Yet he wae within two minutee
telegropbio communication wi~h the Ordnance Bureau at W uhington, where
might have bad fuU information on thia point.
· t
· To the request for ratiooa, General Franklin replies;
.
"I have been inalrnctcd b7 General McOlellan to Inform yon lbal he will hl1'e all the l1'allable
wagons al Alexandr!&loaded wl&b ratlona for your troopo, and all of the oara also, ,u _ , . ,u v-

toia und In a oaoa/.-y uoori lo .41..,,,,ltdrla

iu a (IUGlrd lo lu lra,u .

I cannot better set forth this matter. in ita true bearing, than by giving the

following passage from General Pope's official report:

·

"About daylight or \be 80lb, I received a note frorn General 'Franklin, written by dtreollon ol
Gen~••l MeClelfan, Informing me lbaL rat,ona and forage u,otud be loaded ln,o all tho nallabi.
,ragono and cara at A.lexaddrla, u soon ae l would aendl>acd a cu,.1r1 eacorl IO gurd ~be trains..
Suell a lt!ller, when we 1'Cre OghLio,: the enorny, and Alc;r:aodria wasawannlng with troopo, oeedl
n o oommena. ,:Sad aa wu the cond!Uon of our cavalrf, I was In no 1l18&1lon 10 apare t roope rrom
the rrona, 1&<>r C<Ju/d, th&y h<"N gon• to .Alu,andrla arnL r , tunrdd, 1Dllh£1" eh6 elm• b11 t.Dhtch w

,;.,,.1 h0,1J• 11(14 :provlalo1'1 or MVD•J•U•" back in lh• dlrtoUon 'If Waahington ; nor <lo I
cohal ,,,,.oic6

-i,-.v 001'la luuJ• r6nd#rdd, '1> ouardino raUroad lralM."

•

fH

I must let this oloae this exposition of the extraordinary eeries of trantaotioo.:
at .Alexandria, in which I have done little else than allow official dispat.chea to tell
their own story. I leave the reader to form hia o,rn j udgment and prononnce hia
O'WU verdict.
But one remark remains. I hare hitherto bad occasion to oall ia
IJ.Ueetion General McOlellan'e eapacity. T he conduct here set forth invitee a q uu •
\ton of hia loyalty. I ca nnot enter General H cClellan'11 prin te thought, and p1uok
ont the "heart of hia mystery." It ie Pfi@ible that bis cond1Mt at Alexandria wu
aotlaing more tbu t.ao effeti of heart.I- ..ia.a- aDcl aabillo11, whiu a&11 leN
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11,p to the very door of tre11110n .'l'ithout paasing within, It is now certain that it
was the avowed purpoee of McClellan and bis friends eo to &rr11nge m&tten u th&t
the anny should, to use their expret18ion, "fall back into bis arms" at W asbington. ,
For this epd it wae essential that Pope should not obtain reinforcement8, for bad be
recei'ved the thirty thousand troops that lay idle at Alexandria, he would beyond a
doubt !,ave hrqten t!,e rebel army. That he should do eo w&& manifestly not at &JI
in General Me'Clellan's progr&l'.llme.
·
Looking at Ge'i!er,al McC[ellao'a conduct aa it ataoda revealed in )lis own dispatches,
I can only say to him, "if this be loyalty, make the moet ef it."
o.f
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CLOSING SCENE':! IN foCLELl.AN'S CAREER.
IC, now, aft.er the e:rpod I have made of the conduct of G~neral ll!opleHaJ· in th,;
extraordinary aeries of traoaactioo• recorded in the preceeding chapter, the que• ·
tion be asked, why it wae that, &fter behavior which in any other country 1o the
world would have caused him w be coort-m&rtialed, we find that general not Qoly
MT called to account, but presently restored to the foll command of the Al'my of
the Potomac, I frankly reply that this queetlon must be left to history to an•
ewer. llistory will not fail to ask the question, but the &nswer will be given both
with a fuller knowledge or all the facts in the case than we now posse&'-', and under
oircb.mstances when those cllnsideratiorls'
'I.be pqblio gqod that n,;>w put a check,
oo our venturing on even such 1·evelatio~s· as it is in our power t4) make, will po
lo11ger be in force. We can, however, anticip&te the verdict in eo far as to eay that
history will rec<1goize that, in hie action in this matter, !\Ir. Lincoln was moved only
b,Y the purest and moat patrio~io morivee, and if hie yielding Qf intellectuel convlo-'
tions 'W bich he must even then b11ve formed, indicated a blameable weakne88, lwi'
erred only from the excdl! of bis uoselfish aoxiilty for the public good, at a time
when things and, the thoughts or men were plunged into utter cha~s and collapse.
Pope 1,ad now " got out of hie scrape "-&s best he could, and tile army had faJ.
len back to W asbio§ton, where the arr&ngementa of McClellao's ·friends to have i\
"fall into bia arms ' were crewned with &II the success they could have desir~
Pope fell back to the works in front of WMbiogton on the 2d of September; on the'
same, M:cClellao took command, and Lee, ii ling off the left, proceeded to do what General McClellan, in his lint memorandum, had staked hik military sagacity "no cap&·
blegeneral" would do-that ia, be crossed the Potomac to 111&ke hia first iovu1on
of the loyal St&tts.
I t is not my purpoee to review the Mar7land campaign with that fullness of det&il that baa obarfcterized the analysis o the previous portion of General MoClel•
·lan'a career, for my aim i, not eo much to dia&eet the historical fact.a themselves as
to dissect ~neral McClellan's cbaracter aod conduct aa revealed in these fact&
Now, in this regard, what remaiua fanishes really nothing eBBentially new. We at~
preseuted wit,IJ, \he same characteristic,, of genius &od generalship which we !lave
already di6<l0vered-the same u11readuie111 to move promptly and &ct vigoroualy;
t.he e&me clamoring for "more troops" before advancing; the !!4me reference t,o
the great superiority of.numbera on the part of the eoemy. It is,, afttr all, a dismal
story, and hM probably already tested the human 1tomach to its utmost limi\&
In the Maryl&nd innsion, the intention• of Lee, &ft.eretrikiog Frederick, appear to
hav-e aimed excluaively at the capture of Harper's Ferry. Hi, combinations for this
end a1·e now fuUy revealed by an order of Lee's found at Frederick, and.'whieh diecloees the whole programm.; of operation@. By t.bio it appea1'8 that the commands
of Jackson, Loog~treet, McLawa, and Walker-that i9, in fact, the whole rebel army
with the exception of the division of D. l£. Hill-were &&eigned parts in the cap-'
.l,\\re of Harper', Feri·i• The aingle. division of D, Ill Hill an<l part of Stuart's C&V·
alry fot1Ded the rear guard destined to oheok any pursuit of McClellan, while the
whole rebel force should move to the accom:fliabment of the end proposed.
In a military point of 'l'iew this was a bol operation, and the rebel general ~hould
have 'been made to
dearly for venturing up<>n it. And yet, if we consider thi:t
the c<1mbina'tiooa o a comm1U1der are necW!llrily largely influenced by bi! knowledge of I.be character of his opponent, we must admit that Lee, aware of tbe tardy
genius of McOlellan, w&& authori£ed in taking a step which, against a v,igor.ous op •
ponent1 ought to have seoured his destrtt0tion. At any rate, the event full¥ Justi;i
tied bis action. McClellan, intruated with the duty of meeting and crusb1og th&
invading army, moved out by alow a11d e&&y atage,-al a11 a.,rage of li~mile1 a day
- nd accommod&te<!, Lee ,mh all the time h• 11,eded. OJ covrae, be waa abl• '41
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accomplish hi. designed object-the capture of Idi-per's 'Ferry, its' garrisons and
atoree; but.connected witl, this, and General Mome1f11u'11 re3pOndibility for it., there
are one or two circumstarlces tlfat doo~h·e ,oore dijt&ili•d examinatiou.
There is no doubt that the moment Lee cro,~ed the Potomac, the forces at liarper'd Ferry were placed in a fala~ posiLion anJ ~hou\,I have b~en promptly with1
drawn. But W'e find no recommenJ11tion to this cff~ct by Genernl McOlella11 during
the period io which. it waa possll,le to csrry it out. ' Ilia fir~ utterance on the eubject. is in a di~patch to General Halleck, dated '' Camp near Rock viii~, Sept. 10,"
10 the foUowiug terms:
·
"Colonel Mil.,. \J o\ or near Harper'• Ferry, u I nnderatand, with nine tbouaand troops. He
can d o ootbin~ wbere be 1,, but could be or !(real ~loo tr orde~ \o Join mo. I 1ugge11 tbal h•
1>e ordered to Join me b7 tbe moot pra«lcable r oa.te."
Now let na cgneider what thP r<!dnlt. of fh; ~eefltion of tbia 'order would have
been. Lefs in'itructions to Jackson, Lon~treet, &c., t.o move to the capture of
Harper'e Ferry, are d11ted th.e do,!! prevw,u, Sept. 9. An orde~ to Colonel Miles "to
joih bi,m by the most prscticable route," as recommooded by McClellan, would,
therefore, haveeimpls brought bis fore~ lnt-0 the arms of ~be rebel army1 110d JaeksoB
would hove been anted the trouble of even the scimblanoe of investment be thought
proper 1-<t mal;e of IJarpet·'s Ferry.' fo this state of ra.,u Genernl lla)leok's r&ply o!
the same day to the dispatch of McClellan id as sensible ae could phssibly have been
gh>en:
•· Tbcro fs no way for Colonel Mlle• to Join you al preaeol ; ble only chance II lo defend bll
worts 1111 you can open oommunlcation with him."

"Till you can'open co,mmunioation with him;" but with a" pursuit" at the rate
of six miles a day agaiost ao enemy moviog at the rate of twenty, was the1,a much
chance to "open communication i" Moreover, McClellan loBt the opportunity
offered him of moving by t4t dir<1ct route to Harper•~ F'ert·y. Lee calculate<! th8'
by t.lucat~uing with hi11 )'llllr guard lhe paasage into l'enosylvania It~ 11·011.ld draw
.MeClell..u l>lf fr-OllJ the 'flank march which was open 1,0 t.im to lbrp~r•e Ferry. I.a
this ?aloulation be was correct, aud 'Y hilol he wa. e)lgaged with a feeble det11el11uent
of the rebel foroe al South Mount,aio, the gar~ieon at Harper's Ferry, 12,000 strong,
w~tb nil its V8ll~ military stores, on ihe 14th fell i11to tlie bands of Jnuksoo. Aa a
military tt-ibunal baa pronounced judgment 011 t,bis ,11ad alfair, there i4 no need of
g;oing into it bne; it is proper, however, w cite tbe conclusion of itA ftndiog, which
111 io ~he following terms:
"The c0H11T1IS.IQn baa rroel7 rcmubd on ColCJn•I M11ee, an old oll'l,er, who has been tilled In

" lbe service of hie country. aad ii cannot from any mativoa or delicacy rulhlu from o,msurh•tt Lbose
lo high command, wben II tbinko •ucb j>Cn•u,re i!e.erved. The Oa•1~ral tu-Chief hat 1..1,aoo that
Gen.rat McClellan, I\IVr bavln~ reeeh·ed ordcn to repel the eoeniy iorndiog tbA State or Maryland, marched only sh: mllea per day, on an av~rage, wh~n puromng tl,ts invading army. The
OeJ1crt1l•ln•Ollter also W.llftes lbM In hl8 opinion General McCloUao oould, a,t,t 61,;m.ld ~ • r•
U..Oed. cnl4pro~ llarJ?er•, F,rrv, and,,. U.t. opt"'°" Ou oom,nt1""1n/..u,y
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Gen~ral MoOlellan'a dispatches of thi• period, carefully euppreeaed by him from
his " ·Report," ehow that from the first step he t ook out of Washington in pursuit of
Lee, he was hauo,ted by tho@e horrible visions of the fabulous legiob& of the enemy
that we have aeen constantly oppreeauig him. While •till Gt Rbc\ville, under date
of the 9th Septeml;,er, w11 find h,m writing: "From euoh information as can be obtained, Jackson and Longstreet have about a hundred and ten thooeaod, (110,000)
men of all , arms near Frederick, with some cavalry this eide."
The monetrQSity of this O$timate is readily 11pparent ft•om f,he fact that even had
the Corps of Jae\uon and Longstreet been at tile full {40,000 men each) their united
commauds could only have numl>ored eigbt.y thousand; bot it is perfectly well
known that, ofter the.series of severe actions thl'Ough whicl, they had gone, their
corps did not count ooe-half their complement. But General McClellan wee deetined to go Hveral tboQJ!aud better on thie estimate. R eversing the usual maxim
that
,
'"Tie dWa""" leoda cncbanlment to the ~e ..,"

the Marer McClellan approached the eQem,v, th~ vaster h id proporUvoB grew. On
the lltb we find bim stating· that "almost the entite rebel army in Vj1·gioia,
amounting to not lf:68 than 120,0QO men, ie in the vi<;iuity of Frederick city ;" and
a day or two afterward that arll\Y had re3nmed its old Ohickahomioy p roporliooa
of" 180,000' meo l" Now wiLl\ 1·egard to ~e's army iu Mnryla11~ we hav~ infor,
mation cnore than usually preciae reepeeting its etrength. l t all pa.'18ed through
lrederick city, where it wu carefully Qouoted, aod whre i~ was found to ouwbet,
how mauy <lo you euppoee I It wae found to n11mbijr i>1ecisely fifty five tl,m.,a'ltd
fjfutive me" I Rememb~, now, that :MoClellan's ola Pe11ineular &1·my, ewclltd in
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Washington by a great part of the command of Pope, numbered at thie time over a ,
hmidred a11d twenty tlun_ua,uL•ne11-that ia, tlrat.,McClellan';i force outnumbered the
enemy's more than two to one-and you will have the propeti teJt by which to judge
oi bis generalship in the actions which followed.
,
The rear guard left by Lee at South Mountain fully euooeeded in delaying the ad•
vaoce of McClellan until such time M•J ackson and Hill bad compel~ep. the surrender of
Harper's Ferry and the capitulation. of the ganison. But eve; after arriving before
Ant.ietan,i Creek lie rhad etill,an opportunity,on the ~6th ofl;leptember-the day-beforll tb:e bs ttle--to,stcike Lee b~fore Jackaim returned. 1 rfhia_o.ppertunity; aho,
' thre"II away, r -Saye \All tiEngl.ii ~tl;!,ilitary e.rilic, who always deals !tenderly with •
McClellan: "Examining the proceedirig, .of,the,16th of .&iptie.01ber1 by tht1 ae<.-oun\,
most favorable to the Fede~al leader, there can be no doubt that the extreme cauilon which he then,displayed caused him to throw away 1.h~ opport1tniby,of c.rush•
ing the enemy, whioh the resistance o( Harper's Fer~y, b rief though it w&S, placed I
before him.'
,
,
During that night Jackson 'acrived with h is corps, and the ne:at day, September
17th, when the movement of Hooker drove McCleUau into battle, Lee bad his whole
fomee massed at Antietam. But his whole force waa doubly outnuinbereEI by that
of bfoC\ellan. The batMe was delivered without order or eniemble-the attacks
being made feebly a od in dribl.ets. Saye General Sumner, in regard to the manner
of co02ucting the battle,of:An.tietam:
,,

lie

;,a,;

In

• " I ba,<e al
belie,·ed 'tMt, 1HA'iend of sending thcae troop• Into !bat action drl&let:o u tbef
were sem, if General MeClellall 'had aulborized me 1o'ml1.r'eh tbeee'40,000 men on the left flank o
1)18 enemy,;we ®Uld 001 bave,f ailed to tbrow them :right back In frdnt of the other diviaione o
our army on our le~Bw110jde's, franklin'•, and l'orter'l\}'Orps. Aa It wu, we )Vent In, dMion
after division, until even one of my ow·n d!Ylsion& wna rorced out, the other lwo drove tb'9 Einem:r'
and held their position•. My lntenllou ;.ao to ha~e proeeed~d l,i,llrely on by tilolr Jen a\id mbn
llown, bringing them rlgM In rroll't ofBurneiJle, ~'ranklln and .Porter.
' • ,
.,,
Q~..1io11. And all escape fol' tho enem1 would baye bee11 impo..ible !
Answer. l tblnkeo.••

On the nigb.t of the.18th the eneµiy, abandoned .tbeir position~ their ammuniti01t'
bei1<g exfu/.u;;ted, and ;ret9rl)1jd across theJ>otomae intp Virgi11ia, without lllole~t~tiolly
McC\ellan slpw ly follow~d an9 took up a positiop along the Potoma9, 011· the Ma~yland side. Le~ established ~imself at the mouth of ihe valley, Just south of l;lar·
per's Ferry.
.
•
,
,
,. ,
.' If any !)Ombinatioo of circums~ances can, ,be -co11C/llved calculated to prom,Pta gen4!rt.l to .energetic preparatiqos to, i:,etrieve his tarnished laurels, it was spcl1 ,l\D ex;
perience General McClellen bag passed tbrl)ugh. The campaign tow a.rd Jl.i<1hmo1,1d,
\lndertal;:en on bis favorite line and bega1;1 with loud promises of the spee~y a_noihi•,
lation of the enemy, bad ended ,n that enemy's aS3uming the initiative, invading
the territory' of the loyal States arid compelling lfoClellan's ha,sty .retreat to cover
the capital. The country, which bad lavished its resources to furnish that Genera[
with an incomparable army, felt the profoundest humiliation -and mortification
at the disastrous disappointment of its just expectations, and after Lee's retrea t be•
gan to look anxiously for a blew to be struck that would retrieve the national
honor. Antietam having been fought about the middle of September, there was
a prospect of a season of a couple 9f months, during which the state of tbe roads
and the weather would favor military operations, and 11ne would suppose thali
he would eagerly avail himself 0£,this opportunity to strike a blow. As usual
with him he was during this period constantly promising to do ao. On the 27th he
wrote to General Halleck: "When the river rises so that the enemy cannot
f !lro£8 in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry
acd then moving," etc. Well, shortly after, this condition was fulfi)led, and still•
he remained inactive. The burden of all his commuoicatioos of this period wns·for
more.men, and still more men, though he )lad now under his command an army 150,000
strong. 011 the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to "cross the Potomac a?d
give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. Your army mmt move now while
the roads are good,." Week after week passed without the order being obeyed.To eovtll' up h,s diaob.e4,ie11ce he baa muon to say in hie Report of the deficiency of
the ,mny in shoes, clothing, ,et,e.; bnt the hollowness of tbis pretense is fully dis•
play.ed in the letters of Ge,g.~111 :¥eigs and Halleck, and even by his own chief
.q uartermaster, General bgall(I. ~~ides, even if there were alight deficiencies in
tbis respect, as there will be in ,ey,er11 ,11,rpy, (though no arruy in the world WIii! ever
wpplied as McClellan's waa,) it w.ould. still he.;v,e been better for him to have moved
\With thia d.r.aw.back than, bf waiLiog to auppiy tke deficit, to throw the t ime of
moving over to tJ;i.e Jiad season. Said a corpe Co.o;l,IWlnder in hja army to the writer,
• Beport OIi lbe
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the,rainy November morning, wueu the mo:vemeM finally be~an, ",We could.
beiter have advanced in September ot Oc1,0ber with. ~h,e army barefoot than we can ,
new perfectly 8Upplied I ",
,
,
After nearly two months delay, General Me0lellan wa.s pried from .hie base by an
imperative order, J11sb as he had been pried out of Waehingtoh by the llke means in
the preceding April,, and. he began hie forward movement· by the inner line, east of
the Blue Ridge. But it 8oon became evident. from the slowness of his movements,
tile spirit in wbicb•he acted, and the complications into which be had plunged'
himself witli the militar.y authorities at Wasbingto11, that no good reeult.e eould be
etpeeted from hie ~ampaign. He '1¥&8 acoordingly ordered to reeign eomma11d of
the army at Warrenton, on t he 6th of November.
·
· : .
011

ti

l

t

"I

Thue 'olosea a career certainly among the most extra~din'ary on record, and not
lase extraordinary from tlie, 'record Gene~al McClellan baa given of it to the world in
the Report which has formed the subject-matter of this critique. But it is not yet
possible for any man to follow out in the complex web of historic cause and effect ·
all the results that have come, and may yet come, from -that career. These results
are more and other than milit1my; and they did not cease.when his military cai,eer
closed. If, having failed, 85 a militarr. .commander, he had lefl, us merely the legacy
uf disaster we inhe1·ited from ·him, 1-f we had been orlly destiine,d to find that; tlie
man we had chosen for a leadel' in the dread, ordeal linto whioh the natic,":} wa.
plunged by the war we.a a mere blunderer 1104 incompetent, we might curse pqr
folly ana thank h,e aven 'for havipg rah1ed up other men to.1ight OU!' bat~el!. But he
left ua another heritage than that of military calamities. He darkened men's minde,
1111d ,paralyfe.d their, .arms, with lioubta and fe&1'8. The natlop h~ put forth it$ '
str11ngth laviwl.J>i 9nly, to see it wasted ; bu~ w,e 1)onld,have borne thi11, had not the
very springs of coiifi~ence been leapped by the cltarge that ,all this waste, these dis-~
aaters,' were due to th~ 'incompetenee and malevolence ot the Administration. While
still in command, McClellan lent the weight of his endorsement to the'rlSing.spirit of
faction which sought to throw all the bla~e of'hisfailurea upon an Administration
which the people were taught 'to believe had by its intlnence )>aulked all his brillian.t plans, and wi.thlie\d the material needed to the~ e)\'.ecntion. On being remond
from eo'mmand. McCleflan put these slanders formally on record in his so-called
Report. He baa ended by becoming the leader of a party .which, going on the effect
produced by these vilifications of the Adminjstration, seeks to obtain control of the
destinies of this nation. . , I have attempted to ex1>ose the falsity of these chargea,
if' not wit4 the eXJ?eCtation of silencing 'the clamor of men se.eking their greatness in
their country's ruu1, at least with the hope of dlsabusi,ng honest men of mistaken
notions loo~ lll!Siduously' inculcated, and anticipating for 1the milita.r y conduct of
llr. Lincoln's Administration a part of that justic~ whicli. history
accord it.
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